

Imperial Parliament should have power to tax either all parts of the Empire uniformly, or by special assessment any particular part which was receiving particular benefit from the operation of those services; uniformly let us say, to keep the army and navy upon a peace footing, and by a special assessment, in case of a war that affected some parts of the Empire and not others.

The membership of this Parliament would consist, in the first place, of the entire membership of the English House of Commons. And the reason is that the ancient House of Commons would not be altogether disposed to respect the authority or to acquiesce in the jurisdiction of a body less numerous than itself, but would be apt to treat a smaller house merely as one of its own Committees; whereas if the whole house was or could be present at its deliberations, they could not complain of its usurpation of authority. The number of members in that House is now 655; namely 463 for England, 30 for Wales, 105 for Ireland, and 60 for Scotland. If on the passing of the Redistribution bill, that number be altered, it will be a question of simple proportion to readjust the colonial membership. Secondly, in the local house, I think all the members of the Parliaments of the several branches of the federation should be *ipso facto* members of the Imperial. But in the case of the colonies there would be two inconveniences in the way of sending their entire representation; one, that their numbers would have to be reduced so as to bear to the population of their respective countries the same ratio as the English house does to the population of the United Kingdom; in the case of Canada, from 211 to 81. The other objection is that it might be difficult for the entire body of legislators to attend every year in England. In the case of the Canadian and Australian houses therefore, there should be selected the number of their members they would be entitled to in proportion to their populations. Canada's proportion in such case would be 81, Australia's 54, and the other self-governing colonies about 28, making 821 members in all. These colonial members would be chosen by their respective legislatures, and not directly by the people; both in order to preserve unimpaired the power and dignity of the Colonial Houses, and because it is in the highest degree important that harmony should reign between the two legislatures. In order however to prevent the controlling party in the Colonial Parliament from electing the Imperial members entirely from its own ranks, a scheme of proportional representation, such as Mr. Blake has suggested for the protection of minorities in Parliamentary elections, should be adopted in the election by the colonial houses of those of their members who should represent their country in the Imperial. The Colonial members would receive an indemnity based upon the time they were necessarily absent from their homes. For Canada, say \$2,000 a year, or double what the members of the House of Commons now receive. If however it were found that the duties occupied so much of their time that they had

practically to make it their profession, then I should say that salaries of \$5,000 a year, the amount now paid to members of the United States Congress, might with advantage be paid. I would further opine *en passant* that special courses should be provided in our universities for men who intended to present themselves as candidates for election to Parliament, in order to qualify them for the work of legislation.

As to the upper chamber, it would consist of the House of Lords, modified however so as to reduce its English membership to its proper proportion, and of a competent number of members of the Senates of the several colonies. These might be apportioned not according to population, but in proportion to taxation if there were any difference between the two.

This Parliament would meet once a year in Westminster. Its session would be entirely distinct from that of the English Parliament. The members from the colonies would be carried across the ocean at the government expense. They would have free, absolutely free, telegraphic facilities, during the session of Parliament, for all public and private business, and out of the session for public business. The Executive government would consist of a distinct cabinet, containing representatives from each member of the federation. In case of a dissolution of the Imperial House of Commons, the English and Colonial Parliaments would be also dissolved, in order that appeal might be made directly to the people. The separate legislatures might however be dissolved when deemed necessary by their respective ministries, their members in the Imperial House retaining office until their successors were elected.

This scheme is a modification in several important particulars of one of those suggested by Mr. Jehu Matthews, of Toronto, in a work—the best I have ever seen on the subject—published some years ago, entitled “A Colonist on the Colonial Question.” One distinction is that the Canadian and other Colonial Parliaments are here recognised in the same way as the present English Parliament, whereas Mr. Matthews contemplated a curtailment of the powers of those, and as I understand it, the election of members of the Imperial House directly by the people of each country.

It would appear at first sight that a house of over eight hundred members would be very large. But with some drawbacks there are great advantages in a large number of representatives. They certainly express the general opinion of the people of the country better than a small number. They can, so to speak, back one another up. And after all when you do come to a large assembly, the practical inconvenience is no greater in a house of 800 or even 1000, than in a house of 658. It would be seldom that all the members would care to be present; when they were it would be the simplest matter in the world to arrange so that all could hear the speeches and vote. Most of our city churches seat from 1,000 to 1,200 persons; the Queen's Hall seats