

strong. But no blanket formula gets us through the maze. Moral values may be eternal, but their application in international politics must be *ad hoc*. There is no alternative to grappling with complexity, looking at both sides of every argument and at the step-by-step consequences of each policy. Of course, one can get lost in a maze. There is a time for cutting through argument to some clean simplicity, but not before the argument has been explored *à tous azimuts*. Consider, for example, some of our present dilemmas.

In the name of morality, many Canadians demand stricter safeguards on uranium and reactors sold abroad and the placing of principle above commercial interest. In the name of morality, many (and often the same) Canadians insist on a priority for the needs and wishes of the Third World. The Third World, however, is exceedingly critical of the restrictions the Canadian Government has already placed on nuclear technology. In their eyes, these restrictions reflect a contempt for their sense of responsibility and are a means by which a rich country denies them the benefits of nuclear technology.

Similarly, it seems wicked of the industrial countries to sell even conventional arms to the poor countries. Yet the alternatives are hard to envisage. We can hardly tell them to be good children and not to want nasty arms. It is not conceivable that arms could be limited to developed countries or, at the other extreme, offered free to the poor. Should the poor, therefore, be forced into setting up their own arms factories? On the other hand, does the logic of these negative arguments mean that we abandon the effort to control the proliferation of arms? Obviously not, but we must grapple with such paradoxes.

Armament and disarmament in the nuclear age present peculiar moral dilemmas. Many moralists tend to be against arms and defence spending on principle. They reject deterrence theory without working their way through it, though it can be argued that the idea of mutual deterrence marked a great moral advance. When the superpowers recognized the desirability of their antagonists being confident of a second-strike capacity, we had moved away from the traditional logic of military superiority. Arguments for disarmament that ignore the logic of deterrence on which present Canadian, NATO, and presumably also Soviet, defence policies are based are unlikely to convince. In the confrontation-negotiation situation attained by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we have a rudimentary sort of structure for stability. These military alliances can be seen as the props of *détente*. To regard deterrence as a permanent solution, however, or to argue blindly for stoking our side of it, as some realists do, shows an immoral disregard for the fate of man. Deterrence can be at best only a transitional phase, from which we must move to firmer foundations as soon as possible. At the same time, we must be cautious in dismantling in the name of peace the one structure of peace that has, in a limited way, worked.

There remains a good case for demanding an end to the mad "overkill" for which the super-powers provide. Before we call for general and complete disarmament, however, there are critical questions to be considered. First, what would be the economic fate of small powers in an unarmed world? Secondly, is there a moral purpose in demanding a policy when there is no hope of any great power accepting it? The impossible demand may be a noble

gesture — might it not also be a "cop-out"? Should we not fix our attention on the ways and means being discussed now in Geneva and Vienna of mutually dismantling, or at least controlling, the spread of arms?

But can we afford to wait for their slow progress? If not, what is the alternative? For Canada the possibilities are particularly frustrating. As "the safest country in the world", our disarmament is more likely to be seen as getting a free ride than setting a good example. We cannot, however, sit complacently, mindlessly justifying armament on our side by what the other side is doing. But are our leaders more likely to respond to slogans like "Ban the Bomb" or to proposals that are within the bounds of probability and might just start reversing the cycle? Intelligence is required as well as emotion. Or is the situation so apocalyptic that there is a pragmatic case for howling for apocalyptic solutions.

Sanctions

The moral issues over which we agonize a good deal these days involve the question of sanctions — military, economic, diplomatic and moral. What do we do about wickedness in other countries? It is difficult to ignore gross violations of human rights in Czechoslovakia, Chile, Uganda, and in many other countries whose sins have attracted less attention. But we must first make reasonably sure of the facts, and that is not easy. We have to resist believing the claims only of those whom our prejudices induce us to credit. Horror stories are the stock in trade of those with causes, left or right, black or white. Even when the facts seem indisputable, we still must determine what action we can take, if any. The first human instinct is to cut the offender dead. There is certainly something to be said for making it clear that sin does not win friends and may even alienate customers, and that the UN Charter and covenants are to be respected. It also makes the disapprover feel good, and that is a temptation to be resisted.

Is it enough to sit in judgement? Presumably the purpose is to stop the violation of rights. Governments have to be changed by persuasion, and we should worry about how to accomplish that. Persuading them that they have been wicked is not usually the most effective way. Saving their faces may be less satisfying but more likely to get results. It is a disconcerting fact that more people are probably saved from death, torture or captivity by quiet negotiation than by public denunciation.

There is no escaping these prudent calculations over tactics, sordid as they may seem to the high-minded. There is an argument, for example, for expelling South Africa from the UN, but there is an argument also for not isolating all South Africans from the international community if we hope to change their ways. Is it *ipso facto* true, as alleged, that we are hypocritical if we have any intercourse, especially commercial, with a government whose policies we have deplored? We have been through the same arguments over Russia, Cuba, China and South Africa. The Canadian conclusion, with exceptions, is that there is little to be gained by breaking diplomatic and economic relations, which, in our philosophy, do not imply approval or disapproval.