

sword; Western assistance both helps to stabilize Indian society and prevents New Delhi from adopting less reliable technology, but it also provides the means of furthering India's nuclear weapons programme.

Finally, there remains the thorny issue of Pakistan, with whom India, since Partition, has fought such important conflicts. All posturing and rhetoric aside, Pakistan, with one-eighth the population and a moribund economy, poses no serious conventional threat to India. The possibility of Pakistan developing an indigenous nuclear capability, so long as the condition of "ambiguous deterrence" remained undisturbed, never played more than a marginal role in New Delhi's quest for nuclear power status. Now that both parties have openly declared their status as nuclear weapon states, however, Pakistan's nuclear capability will play a large role in India retaining, improving and expanding its nuclear capability.

This is likely for three reasons. First, the fact that both states possess and are improving ballistic missiles capable of reaching each others' major cities drastically reduces decision-making time in a crisis (to the order of 8-10 minutes, as compared to 20-30 minutes for Washington and Moscow during the Cold War), and greatly reduces the possibility of recalling a strike force. The result is gravely destabilizing, particularly given Pakistani political instability, and it is likely for this reason that both sides have to date resisted the urge to arm or deploy their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Second, unlike the superpowers during the Cold War, neither India nor Pakistan possesses even a modest ballistic missile early warning system. The lack of such a system further lowers confidence. Third and finally, neither party has made significant progress towards developing a submarine-launched ballistic or cruise missile capability. The lack of a small survivable deterrent force increases the need for a large force of land-based missiles to ensure a survivable second-strike capability, and adds to the likelihood of both states adopting policies based on less stable launch-on-warning rather than more stable launch-under-attack doctrines.

Pakistan - Driving Factors

The factors driving Pakistan's quest for a nuclear weapons capability are fewer and less nebulous than those underlying India's nuclear programme. They are threefold: the threat posed by India, the problem of internal politics, and the deteriorating social fabric of Pakistan.

The single largest engine is of course India, with whom Pakistan is locked in persistent and bitter conflict over Kashmir. India's nuclear developments in the wake of the Chinese nuclear tests coincided with the 1971 war that resulted in the shattering of the divided Pakistani state, highlighting the potential threat to Pakistan that India, already vastly superior in conventional forces, would pose if armed with nuclear weapons. Unlike India, where the quest for international recognition played a large role in the decision to develop a nuclear weapons capability, Islamabad has sought nuclear status almost solely in response to India's decision to do so, viewing India, in a sense, in the same