

Table 2 summarizes some arms control agreements and regimes associated with non-proliferation, their implementing bodies, and the verification methods employed. It should be noted that there are formal implementing bodies designated in some agreements, less formal arrangements involving use of the UN Security Council and its bodies in other agreements, and some agreements with no formal implementing mechanisms.

The potential synergistic effects among these formal and informal implementing bodies should be recognized and utilized by assuring closer cooperation and exchanges of data between them. A few specific examples follow:

- In the bilateral area, the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the INF Treaty Special Verification Commission (SVC), and the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) have similar responsibilities and charters. All rely on NTM, and the SVC and JCIC both are responsible for cooperative measures including data exchanges, notifications, and OSIs. In addition to benefitting from lessons learned in these separate bodies, there should be opportunities to coordinate OSIs in a manner which improves their effectiveness. These opportunities are recognized and being implemented by OSIA in its operations.
- In the multilateral area, the data acquired by flights permitted under the Open Skies agreement will be valuable to the IAEA, the CWC Conference of State Parties, and the CFE Joint Consultative Group. Conversely, data from these bodies and their requirements will make the Open Skies flights more effective in acquiring useful information.

- Future regional arms control implementing bodies will have to rely on the individual parties' NIM, data provided by respected international bodies such as the IAEA and Open Skies Consultative Committee, and shared information from nations with advanced NTM/MTM. NIM can focus requests for data from outside sources; conversely, data from these outside sources can focus NIM resources.

Within the United Nations, there are beneficial synergies from the activities of UNSCOM and IAEA in the case of inspections of Iraq. Similar situations may occur in the future in which UN resolutions and sanctions are directed at assuring compliance with multilateral agreements, for example, the CWC, and regional agreements, such as the Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The United Nations should give serious consideration to establishing a new body which would perform expanded functions of the IAEA and UNSCOM for current and future agreements constraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The United Nations should establish a body for acquiring, integrating, and analyzing information from a variety of sources to assist in verifying compliance with multilateral and regional agreements. Determination of its scope and function and assessments of its effectiveness should take into account the synergistic effects among its sources of information and the countries involved. Such a body could provide information to all states which are parties to current and future non-proliferation agreements and to those UN bodies charged with implementing these agreements.

