

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let us take another example -- the demands of some delegations to conduct immediately after the convention enters into force the verifications of the credibility of the declarations of the chemical-weapon stockpiles and to this end to submit information on the places of the storage of such stockpiles. The Soviet delegation has already repeatedly explained why it considers such demands both unrealistic and unacceptable. I shall now repeat only the following -- in certain cases they inherently threaten the national security interests of the States Parties to the future convention. Nevertheless this demand is being stubbornly repeated, even though, as we have already stated, it can lead to a stalemate in all the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time there is a simple way out of the situation which was proposed by the Soviet delegation. We have in mind the international systematic of verification, at the depots at special facilities, of the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons, through which all such stocks would proceed during the destruction process and consequently the initial declarations would also be verified.

Let us look at the situation with regard to the verification problem from the following angle. The delegations of the USSR and other socialist countries have very often repeated that the prohibition of chemical weapons may become a reality only in the case when the verification measures of the future convention correspond to the nature of the obligations and are determined in strict accordance with the requirements of such a convention i.e. on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To take extremes in this matter, regardless of how they are embellished, would torpedo the current negotiations. We pay no less attention than other States to the effective control of the implementation of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We do not have a slightest basis to trust our negotiating partners any more than they trust us. Our premise is that each type of activity prohibited or limited by the convention should be effectively verified. To this end, during the negotiations we have proposed and continue to propose a very broad range of verification measures. They include national control, the use of national technical means, on-site inspection on a voluntary basis or, as it is also called, by challenge, and international systematic on-site inspections. Confidence in compliance with the convention is also promoted by various declarations by the States parties, many of which have been proposed by us.

One of the unresolved problems remain the methods of verification of the destruction of stocks at special facilities. This is a very important question and we pay great attention to it. The Soviet delegation has already had occasion to state its approach to this question. As is known, it stated that it was in favour, in this concrete case, of the use of systematic international verifications, the annual number of which (the quota) would be determined by the Consultative Committee individually for each facility on the basis of preliminary agreed criteria. That is to say, the number of visits would depend upon such notions as the quantity of the stocks to be destroyed, their toxicity and danger characteristics, technological parameters of the destruction facilities, etc. We have described it in detail both within the Working Group and in the course of various consultations with other delegations.

Such a differentiated, one might say scientific, approach could, in our opinion give the States parties to the future convention complete confidence that the stocks of chemical weapons are being really destroyed and eliminated.