

to assess the number of munitions declared; and then assess the capacity of the chemical munition filling facilities and the chemical warfare agent production facilities declared. The Consultative Committee should then compare the data collected from these on-site inspections with both the declarations of the State concerned and if appropriate with the estimates of that State's capability provided by other States parties.

(ii) The non-production of chemical weapons during the implementation period

The destruction of CW agent production facilities may not be completed until up to 10 years after the Convention enters into force. It will thus be necessary to ensure that none of these facilities are used in this period. To this end we consider it necessary that the Consultative Committee should seal up such facilities with tamper-proof locks within six months after the Convention enters into force. The Consultative Committee should therefore undertake regular on-site inspections at these facilities until they are dismantled or converted to check that the seals have not been broken.

(iii) The destruction, dismantling or conversion of stocks and production facilities

The United Kingdom considers it necessary that Consultative Committee experts should have on-site access during the destruction of chemical warfare agent stocks so that they can analyse the nature of the agent, its concentration, and the volume destroyed. Similarly, experts should be able to determine the quantity of munitions destroyed, and that the munitions are indeed those which the State said it was going to destroy. Finally, experts should have on-site access during the conversion and/or dismantling of production facilities to check that these facilities are properly converted so that they can no longer be used in the production of chemical weapons. The Consultative Committee would then monitor, during the period set for implementation, the estimated stocks and production facilities of each State party with the estimated stocks and production facilities destroyed, dismantled or converted.

12. Following the implementation period, the United Kingdom believes that the Consultative Committee should again play an important role, while the scope for confidence-building measures outside the Consultative Committee will also increase. The Committee should be responsible for the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This would require regular on-site inspections to converted chemical production plants to ensure that they had not been reconverted to their original use. It would also require on-site inspections to those facilities