

by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive

and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve

and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

To this "consensus" definition, we can add the following categories of Confidence-Building Measures:

(A) *Information and Communication CBMs*

- (1) Information Measures (the exchange and publication of technical information about military forces as well as, possibly, defence budgets);
- (2) Communication Measures (the provision for direct exchanges of information such as "Hot Lines");

(3) Notification Measures (the timely announcement of all military manoeuvres and movements beyond a specified size (whether aggregated or not), including acceptably detailed information on the nature of the movement or manoeuvre);

(4) Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures – a "grey" area measure restricted to establishing how observers at manoeuvres should be treated and how they should act in order to make their function useful but not too intrusive;

(B) *Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs*

(1) Inspection Measures (the intrusive complement of Manoeuvre Observer Measures, these measures call for the intrusive monitoring of behaviour according to agreed criteria. The Inspection Measures of the MBFR Associated Measures are good examples. This category could also include the use of early warning devices);

