

Austauschdienst. The arguments in favour of such an agency are compelling, not only in terms of greater autonomy from the political process, but also in terms of better coordination of activities, since all operations could be centralized under one roof. However, what many fail to realize is that there is always a price to pay for such advantages. As the British Council has found out repeatedly, removing an agency from direct political influence does not exempt it from political influence, nor does it ease the arduous job of acquiring public funds. The Council has had to fight for its life repeatedly. Since World War II, it has been subjected to no less than 11 parliamentary and official investigations. As recently as 1976, the Central Policy Review Staff, while paying tribute to the excellent work undertaken by the Council, nevertheless recommended its dissolution. Moreover, despite the outstanding quality of its operations, the Council has always found it exceedingly difficult to obtain the necessary funds to do the job that it has felt should be done to truly promote Britain's intellectual and aesthetic interests abroad.

In the Canadian case, the establishment of a new, independent agency is extremely questionable in view of the present economic situation, even though it may be the only viable solution in the long-run. As long as political considerations do not constitute a significant threat, there is little need to divorce the administration of Canada's cultural relations abroad from the political process, particularly when there is another possible option which provides a sufficient degree of political autonomy while simultaneously providing enough proximity to the political process to achieve the desired result. This brings us to a consideration of the final option, namely revising the administrative structure in order to make it more efficient, responsive and forceful in the international field.

To appreciate the full value of the final option, it is necessary to make a distinction between three distinct areas of responsibility: first, development of the necessary infrastructure (cultural relations officers, cultural centres, display facilities, resource libraries, information repositories and the like); second, coordination, policy and planning; and third, programming. At present, the Department of External Affairs is expected to assume almost total responsibility in all three areas. However, as has been concluded time and again throughout this document, Canada will never have a dynamic and forceful presence in the world until many other federal, provincial, municipal and private agencies and institutions become extremely active in the field.

In terms of effective rationalization of the field, while the Department of External Affairs has fundamental responsibilities in all three areas, in relative terms, it would make sense for it to concentrate more of its resources on the first two areas of responsibility, namely, development of the necessary infrastructure and coordination, policy and planning. In this way, the programming responsibility could be shared more equitably between the Department of External Affairs and the many other public and private sector institutions which have a stake in Canada's international cultural relations, such as the Canada Council, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the provincial ministries of education and cultural affairs, the arts councils, the universities and similar other institutions. Since many of these institutions have a high degree of political independence, and since programming is the area where political manipulation is most often felt, the fear of undue political manipulation would be avoided. At the same time, political representation as well as a realistic sharing of the overall responsibility for these relations would be achieved. Realization of these benefits would be greatly