

tempted. Its oldest lessons are sometimes, therefore, the last that are acquired, and the theme which escapes the grasp of a multitude, may suddenly illuminate the light of a solitary witness. Let it not, then, be considered a marvel, if, in adopting a different mode to the one frequently observed in studying man's construction, a dissimilar conclusion be arrived at. The ordinary statements on this important subject are founded upon the abstractions of mental philosophers. These declare that man is a compound of mind and matter. Against a conception so strict and exclusive, many difficulties present themselves in formidable array. It is asked to define these words. What is mind? What is matter? And no answer that professes to be explanatory can be framed, without involving, more or less, contradiction, heaping up some, if not much, confusion, and, when it is told, leaving unsolved the question originally propounded. To say that man is only mind and matter, is to leave out of sight the simplest fact of existence, to exclude life, the vivifying principle upon which all sensitive manifestations of corporeal actions depend. Life is evidently something that is neither one nor the other. Matter is an inanimate substance; even when created into an organic form and into textural conformations, it has no power in nor of itself to entitle it to any other rank than among things that are dead. Mind is merely an evidence of life, but is not life itself, for it is found as a mark only in the higher order of intelligences, and even in these it may be unmanifested from disease or other interference while vitality, in the full sense of the term, is enjoyed. Neither can mind nor matter be chosen as the prerogatives of man. The latter he enjoys in common with all the visible creation; in this possession the humblest leaf that skirts his walk is his equal, both own a common mother, of her clay they are built, and to her—the earth—they shall return, "all flesh is as grass." No more can the former be called his own; as many disputants may not rise to divide the claim with him as in the antecedent possession; but still he is not left alone. In the competition, however, the advantage is with him, and he stands forth characterized by super-excellence in a scale of comparative progression. Accordingly some observers have entertained the opinion that

"The minds of the inferior animals are essentially of the same nature with that of the human race; and that of those various and ever-changing conditions of it, which we term the mental faculties, there are none of which we may not discover traces more or less distinct in other creatures." Page 178.

An acquiescence in these propositions leaves the question of man's constitution unanswered. Man is evidently more than a first-class animal. It is true as far as the somatic elements of which his frame is constructed,—as far as the peerless skill of the Great Artificer is displayed in the dis-