

Professor Ferrier's argument goes, in maintaining that the Ego is known, and that the Non-ego, or some state of the Ego, is also known, the two cognitions taking place simultaneously. Perhaps the one position, that the Ego knows itself along with whatever it cognises, does imply the other: that what is known is the synthesis of subject and object; but the latter cannot be evolved out of the former by a barely logical process; and the validity of the inference (if it possess validity) can be made apparent only by an exposition of what is meant by the Ego knowing itself in all cognition; in other words, by a definition of knowledge, not in respect of its object, but in respect of its essential nature. Such a definition requires, in fact, to be given, before we are entitled to speak of an *object known* at all. Professor Ferrier appears to have had no qualms of conscience in introducing his readers, at the very beginning of his Institutes, to what he calls the *object of cognition*—defining cognition by means of its object; but he ought to have reflected that, until we have determined what cognition itself is, we cannot so much as form an idea of what the words, *object of cognition*, signify.

It will be observed that Professor Ferrier's Epistemology being a theory of the necessary structure of all knowledge, his answer to the question: What is knowledge? must hold good not only for the cognitions of finite minds, but for the divine knowledge likewise. Now, even if all the cognitions of finite minds could be supposed to have certain common characteristics, in virtue of which they might be designated by one notion, can it be legitimately taken for granted that there is anything whatsoever in common between knowledge in God, and knowledge in his creatures? From the poverty of language, we are compelled to use the same term *knowledge*, to describe the exercise of intelligence by God, which we employ to describe the exercise of our own intelligence; but that the knowledge of God has anything whatsoever in common with the knowledge of created beings—that there are any necessary laws of cognition to which the divine knowledge, and ours, and that of all other creatures, are alike subject—is certainly not a thing to be lightly assumed. Must not God, (Professor Ferrier will ask), know himself in every exercise of his infinite intelligence? And this is the sole respect in which it is contended that knowledge in God and knowledge in us are governed by a common law. (It is difficult to conduct such discussions in a becoming manner; and there is nothing which I am more anxious to avoid, than the appearance of employing the name of God as though it were an unmeaning symbol. But the point under consideration, and others that will arise before the close of the paper, have so vital