

BAZAINE'S LAST SORTIE.

A correspondent of a German paper gives the following account of the last sortie from Metz before its surrender:

Our troops received the alarm between one and two o'clock in the afternoon that the army of the enemy was again about to make a sortie. The brisk fire from cannon, mitrailleuses, and small arms, which soon began, showed that we were this time to have something more than a mere skirmish between outposts. Strong columns of the enemy had passed over into Maxe, the village burned down on the night of the 27th September, and had, as was natural in such sorties, driven back our outposts by dint of numbers, at the first assault. The cannonade became every moment livelier, and soon extended along the entire plain next to the Moselle, which stretches to the north of Metz. The plain was, it is well known, avoided by the enemy in his sorties up to the 27th of September. Since then, however, it has been selected as its chief place of encampment. The attack of the enemy was carried on in great force and with much vigor. In such sorties the enemy had a great advantage in the Chassepot on account of its great range—200 paces. About a quarter to three a living fire from cannon, mitrailleuses and small arms showed that the combat was going on along the whole line of the Moselle up to Bellevue. About this time also the Batteries of the enemy, which were erected inside the Fort St. Julien, in the wood of Grimont, began to disquiet our camp. The line of fighting was upwards of a mile long. On the right and left of the Moselle a lively contest went on between the artillery on both sides. Immediately after the first alarm had been given, I rode to a height in the village of Argancy, from which you could look down upon the entire field of battle. But, owing to the cloudiness of the weather and the smoke of the powder, I could not perceive clearly a single movement. The whole of the plain of the Moselle, in which the fight took place, was covered by one continuous cloud of smoke. Only here and there could you see the blaze of cannon, and the consequent increase in the smoke. About a quarter past three ascended two columns of smoke, which indicated the burning of two villages, probably Ladonchamps and Bellevue. The violence of the conflict reminded one of the 18th of August—at one time the thunder of the cannon, at another the fire of the small arms predominant; both never ceased for a moment. The direction of the latter, which at a quarter to four was towards the south-east, showed that the enemy was retreating. Scarcely, however, did the conflict show some symptoms of cessation in one place than it broke out with greater violence in another. As far as could be seen in the confusion, the small arms of the enemy and the cannons of the Prussians were most actively employed. Our batteries were again erected in the semicircle stretching from the village of Norroy over Fèves, Semécourt, Maizeres, Argancy, Olgy, Melroy, and Charly, and were in constant operation, alternately discharging single shots and whole salvos on the columns of the enemy. Altogether from 120 to 150 cannon were employed on our side. The batteries in the neighbourhood of the villages of Argancy and Olgy were especially active on account of the situation. The position to the south of the village of Olgy was about five o'clock

strengthened by the arrival of two new batteries. On the side of the enemy the mitrailleuses and the cannon on Fort St. Julien were most remarkable. Those fired shots to a distance of three quarters of a mile; so that they not only reached several places occupied by us—Faily, Charly, Melroy, and Olgy but even went beyond them. A great many of their grenades fell on the height, which is bounded on the north by the villages of Argancy and Chatilly, and on the south by the villages Olgy, Melroy, and Charly. Fortunately, the greater part of these terrible projectiles missed their aim, which was, apparently, our batteries erected in that region. The shells which fell in the village of Olgy did but little damage. Between five and six o'clock, when darkness began to approach, the combat once more raged with remarkable violence. The peculiar rattling sound of the mitrailleuse was again heard. About six o'clock the battle seemed to be at an end, and I therefore returned to headquarters. Scarcely had I arrived there when I heard once more—it was now about half past six—the firing renewed. Then silence succeeded until seven o'clock, when fighting re-commenced. Repeated and continuous firing from small arms and cannons lasted until near nine, after the moon had begun to shine. The latter conflicts had been induced by our army, in order to compel the enemy to quit a strongly defended position in the neighbourhood of St. Remy and Ladonchamps, which he had gained at the commencement of the fight. In this our troops succeeded. The result of this battle, the severest and most important which has taken place before Metz since the 1st of September, is, alas! a negative one for both sides. Both have lost many men without gaining any advantages. In the peculiar position of our army, it is quite impossible to follow up the victory by penetrating into the immediate vicinity of the fortress. However bravely, therefore, the attacks of the enemy have been repulsed, the successes gained cannot satisfy the victor. I have not ascertained the exact amount of the losses. Jurs alone must amount to several hundreds. On our side the principal brunt of the battle was borne by the 10th Army Corps and the Landwehr division Von Kummer, which is now under command of General Von Volghts Rhetz.

PRUSSIAN DEMANDS.

(From the London Times.)

In three successive circulars to the representatives of the confederation at foreign courts, Count Bismarck has stated openly what Germany desires and why. For generations past France has been the enemy of Germany, and this war is only one of a series of attacks which Germany has been compelled to sustain. This time Germany has been victorious and therefore desires to turn her victory to permanent account. In their views national ambition has no place. They claim only the right to protecting themselves against a repetition of aggressions from which they have so long suffered, and the means of this protection they recognize only in the transfer to themselves of those fortresses and districts from which French invasions have proceeded. "The cession of Strasbourg, Metz, and the adjacent territory" constitutes the demand of the conquerors. These are the words of Bismarck on the 1st of this month, and he adds "as yet I have never and nowhere raised demands going beyond these ideas."

Such a cession would leave France with an extent of dominion still equal to that which she possessed only eleven years since, for the acquisition of Savoy and Nice brought her a gain in territory sufficient to compensate for the loss now in contemplation. In population she would be slightly a loser—that is to say her 42,000,000, would be reduced to 41,250,000, but that is all. Count Bismarck concludes that for all purposes, except those of aggression on Germany, the power of France would remain unimpaired.

The French dispute the premises and disavow the conclusion. They assert that Germany is in no need of protection, and declare that the cession of a single inch of territory would be such an outrage on national honor that the last extremities would be preferable. They affirm that the war was the work of the late Emperor. If Imperial France was aggressive, Republican France will be resolutely averse from war. The Germans, therefore, have no occasion to demand the security they seek, and in thus seeking it at the cannon's mouth, under the walls of Paris, they are themselves becoming the aggressors, and avowing principles of extravagant conquest.

To these representatives Count Bismarck has replied that he cannot accept as satisfactory the guarantee which France offers. On the contrary the danger in future will be greater than ever, inasmuch as the French will never forget their defeat, nor forgive it. The Republicans have peace perhaps at their hearts just now, but Germany cannot believe in so complete a transfiguration of national policy. France will infallibly attack Germany again, and the Germans are determined to improve the present by curtailing her advantages. Count Bismarck declares, in the plainest terms, not only that Germany will abstain from intervention in the domestic affairs of France, but that she is perfectly indifferent to the course those affairs may take. The French may constitute their own Government after their own choice, and adopt any kind of Monarchy, or any kind of Republic, according to their pleasure. Whatever may be the form, the Germans will recognize it as soon as the French have recognized themselves, and negotiate with it in the terms of peace apart from all reference to its character. "Establish your authorities and give us our security," says the Count, "and we are ready to go."

Admitting that distrust is natural, we cannot believe in the value or in the necessity of the security required, we do not think the territory claimed is needed for the protection of Germany, or that it would answer that purpose. Count Bismarck himself admitted to M. Jules Favre that the annexation could only be accomplished in defiance of the feelings of the population and the opinion of Europe. The advantage of the new frontier would be counterbalanced not only by the disaffection of the inhabitants, but by the extreme offence given to France. The compensation, could not be regarded as immoderate; nor is such coinage altogether out of circulation in international settlements. But its use becomes more and more an offence against public morality year after year, and the Germans could hardly do better in their own interests and those of Europe than tie the French down to the principles of their own present proclaiming. What is now urged to keep the Germans from Alsace will effectually serve to keep the French from the Rhine, and the conquerors in a war like this can well afford to dispense with a more material barrier.