

directed so much toward what is significant as toward what is definable. Nevertheless numbers can speak louder than words. The statement "India is a poor country" has no empirical meaning. But the statement "India contains over 25 per cent of the people of the world who earn less than X dollars a year" provides a basis for further research, not to speak of policy. It seems probable that, as research continues, more and more areas of world politics will lend themselves to this kind of empirical analysis. In any case, we should be wrong to judge the enterprise by the results so far achieved.

### Debate by scholars

Some scholars have pointed to another supposed consequence of current methods of research — the neglect of policy issues and normative values. It may be true that this separation of fact and value is an important characteristic of natural science, but does the distinction apply to social science, and if so is it desirable to apply it? This is not the place to examine this debate, but it may be noted that, when scholars do plunge into debates over foreign policy, they do not usually emerge with academic reputations intact. There is a case to be made for the theorists and the inhabitants of the empirical jungle "doing their own thing". If the results are hardly noticeable to the policymaking world, this does not mean they will never be noticed or that the results do not have value. As for hidden assumptions about policy, the best the student can do presumably is to make his assumptions explicit and to leave to others the task of making judgments about the results.

This debate raises the question however, of whether and, if so, how academics and policymakers should co-operate on questions of foreign policy of mutual concern. Even assuming Lord Strang's dictum — "In diplomacy, as in morals, the particular case is not to be solved by the rigid application of a general rule" — what does the academic have to contribute to policymaking? Broadly speaking, he has knowledge, methods of analysis and independence of mind, in various proportions. There are, of course, people who claim to know all there is to know about a particular place or particular phenomenon. Expertise of this kind can be tapped by contract research or by seminars or simply by setting up research departments. But much of this knowledge is relatively remote from the concerns of a middle-power foreign office, and where answers are required they can often be provided from within the resources of the government.

The area or language scholar may have more to gain by co-operation of this kind, because it is often difficult for him to visit his area of interest without official support. There is a second category of expertise which relates to designing means for achieving particular ends, such as an aid project or the regulation of pollution. Domestic departments of government rely on this kind of research assistance all the time, and foreign offices are coming to do so more, although, in their case, the exercise of political judgment about the interaction with the external environment is usually more significant and difficult. Contract research may be the most practical way of utilizing this kind of knowledge. The third contribution — independence of mind — is more difficult to evaluate. It will depend in part on what political leaders need and what they expect from their permanent advisers. It will vary from country to country. The independence may, of course, be surrendered, but it need not be.

### Over the longer term

In addition to wanting to know what is going on and how to do certain things, foreign offices may want to call on outside advice about what to do — not tomorrow but next year or over the longer term. Sometimes they need to know what they have done themselves. Information overload can affect not only day-to-day business but the finding out of what was done before. While it may be true that every diplomatic situation is *sui generis*, a knowledge of history, i.e. the files, will often help to spot similarities and to avoid mistakes. Research of this kind cannot usually be undertaken by "desk" officers.

Moreover, the political scientist may be able to identify regularities and to notice patterns to which the official is blind, partly because they are more explicitly suggested by methods of analysis which are familiar to the former and not the latter. As to the question "what to do?", the advantages of academic advice would seem to reside more in training than in judgment. Systematic analysis is not a preserve of the universities. But it is more likely to be found there than in government.

Deterrence theory may or may not be in the public interest (who is to decide?), but there is no doubt that it owes much of its influence on public policy to those American academics who elaborated models of bargaining in the 1950s. The balance of power may or may not be a useful way to think about war and peace, but there is no doubt that many governments do think this way and there is much to be said for

*Foreign offices moving toward relying more on research aid in achieving particular ends*

*Political scientist may be able to notice patterns 'to which the official is blind'*