

but the League itself that failed in that instance. That, of course, is a mere quibble. The small nations of the League could no more initiate action than they can now, but they would have been prepared to follow the lead of the powerful states. I am reminded of a speech which was made in this city less than a year ago—I believe it was in May of last year—by Doctor Myrdal, of Sweden, speaking at the annual meeting of the League of Nations Society of Canada. The account of his speech is taken from the *Winnipeg Free Press* of July 16, 1938, where it is pointed out that Doctor Myrdal is a leading economist of Sweden, a member of the senate, and closely associated with the government in the working out of its policies. Doctor Myrdal said:

When the League of Nations was founded after the great war it was, for us, natural to join it. We entered the League with full understanding that it meant giving up our position of neutrality and assuming our part of the responsibility for collective security. We did it with eyes open to the constructional faults, and consequently the inherent dangers, in the treaties and in the covenant of the League. We believed in the possibility of a development which, using a slogan now very often heard, although in glaring contrast to actual events, might be defined as "peaceful change." There were already in the beginning people in Scandinavia who would rather have us freed from some of the obligations of the covenant, particularly the sanctions. But the overwhelming majority of our peoples were at that time prepared to carry these obligations which they rightly considered necessary in a system of collective security.

Later on we saw, however, how the degenerative factors, inherent in the development from the very beginning, were gaining ascendancy. The process of deterioration may perhaps be said definitely to have begun in September, 1931, and the turning point is associated with the name of Mukden. Since that date the history of the League of Nations in the political field has been to us a chain of vain efforts, half-hearted attempts, hypocritical demonstrations; a chain, I should almost say, of public scandal. In no other part of the world have these events been watched with more profound dejection than in Scandinavia. Nowhere else would a straight-lined policy of keeping up the principles of the League of Nations have been approved more thoroughly. The bitter feeling of disillusionment has crept into the very heart of our peoples.

And what is our reaction? We do not want to be deceived, and we therefore realize that for the time being the whole system of sanctions and various other principles of the security system laid down in the covenant, have *de facto* ceased to function. That means, *inter alia*, that the League is no longer—and this is most important to us—in any appreciable degree a guarantee of our freedom and peace in Scandinavia. We have therefore had to reverse our disarmament policy.

This all looks certainly like an isolationist policy. But it is an isolation pressed upon us. We do not want it. We want the general

[Mr. MacInnis.]

League of Nations. We look upon our co-operation in the north of Europe rather as the petty little bit of international cooperation which we can now keep up. In the circumstances our cooperation within Scandinavia is our most important task.

Commenting on this, the *Free Press* says:

The Scandinavian countries, as Doctor Myrdal said, supported the League, including sanctions, as long as there was reason to believe that the great powers, which can make or break the League and must therefore assume the responsibility for its policies, regarded the League as a guarantee of the integrity of member nations against aggression.

Coming back to the invasion of Manchuria, it was pointed out, I believe by the hon. member for Comox-Alberni (Mr. Neill), that Lord Lytton, a Britisher, was the chairman of the commission which was appointed to inquire into that matter. Lord Lytton spoke with inside authority when he said, on May 17, 1934, in an address at Manchester university, that the government's failure to restrain Japan might have been justified by pleading that—

The far eastern situation is one which cannot be effectively dealt with without the co-operation of the United States of America, a country which is not a member of the League. But we have never been told that our government has proposed to the League to invite the cooperation of the United States of America or that it has itself made proposals to the government of that country which have failed to find acceptance. On the contrary, the United States have made overtures which have not been reciprocated, and the failure of our government to back up Mr. Stimson is perhaps the most regrettable of all its shortcomings.

I would remind hon. members that that statement was made by Lord Lytton, chairman of the commission that inquired into the Sino-Japanese affair in 1931 or 1932. Lord Lothian, speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs on December 12, 1934, and referring to the same subject, said:

I have always thought that the mistake of British policy at the time was its rejection of Mr. Stimson's offer to reverse the isolationist decision of 1920 and act with us in support of the collective system in the Pacific. This failure on our part to live up to the spirit and the letter of the Washington treaties early in 1932 drove the United States back into isolation.

The reason that the British government has never at any time, at least since 1931, made any attempt to honour her obligations under the League is that she did not consider the upholding of the reign of law incumbent upon her—that is, that the reign of law was in her national interest, that is to say, in the interests of the propertied class of Great Britain. The case for the British government was put very neatly by Mr. Amery, a

member of the British parliament, in a speech in the House of Commons on February 27, 1933, when he said:

When you look at the fact that Japan needs markets and that it is imperative for her, in the world in which she lives, that there should be some sort of peace and order, then who is there among us to cast the first stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continual aggression—

I wish you to note that phrase.

—of vigorous Chinese nationalism.

Our whole policy in India and in Egypt stands condemned if we condemn Japan.

That is one of the reasons why Great Britain could not and did not as the leading power in the League of Nations take an active part in stopping aggression during the last few years. The reason for the failure of the league is the fact that no obstacles were put in the way of Japan because the ruling class of Great Britain, the strongest unit in the league, considered that the people of the backward nations were proper material for exploitation by the predatory countries. In other words, the British ruling class said to themselves, "If we stop Japan, perhaps Japan will call attention to the fact that we are doing in India and Egypt what we are condemning her for doing in China. And the people in India and Egypt are not perhaps as dumb as they once were."

In the present invasion of China by Japan the British government has not shown up any better than it did in 1931 and 1932, nor for that matter has the government of Canada, as was clearly and ably shown by the hon. member for Weyburn (Mr. Douglas) yesterday afternoon. In all the strife, in all the bloodshed, all the raining of bombs on helpless women and children, the present British government never rises above thinking in terms of investments, nor does the government of Canada. Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, on July 26, 1938, made this statement:

It cannot be said that we are disinterested as a country in the position in the far east, because for a hundred years our interests in China have been of great importance, and when the Japanese government claim that they are protecting their interests in China, I am sure they must recognise that we too have our interests in China and that we cannot stand by and see them sacrificed in the process.

What was troubling Mr. Chamberlain was not the death and destruction that was poured upon the defenceless people of China but the material interests of British capitalists in that country. The next day Lord Halifax followed

Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Lords with similar remarks. He said that the government were:

Already considering possible action open to us if we do not get that consideration for our interests and rights which we have a right to expect. The noble viscount spoke of several matters, such as the navigation of the Yangtze and inland waterways, the Whangpoo conservancy, access to British property in certain districts of Shanghai, and British interests in the railways. All these matters are at the present time under discussion between his majesty's ambassador and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

What are "all these matters"? British commercial interests are the matters that receive the consideration of the British government. There is not a word about the lives of the men, women and babes who were being torn asunder, blown to bits by the war machine of Japan, fled in part by material from Canada at a handsome profit to the sellers.

I have not the time to go into this question as fully as it deserves to be gone into. It is a dark blot on the history of Great Britain, and, I regret to say, on the history of Canada.

Japanese aggression in China was discussed on various occasions by the League of Nations. While the nations of Europe—Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain, were engaged in the Munich affair, the League of Nations was in session at Geneva. Mr. Wellington Koo, the head of the Chinese delegation at the assembly of the League, again referred to Japanese aggression. Let me quote from a verbatim report of the proceedings of the nineteenth session of the assembly, Friday, September 16, 1938: Mr. Koo said:

In this hour of Europe's acute crisis I know many of you have your minds preoccupied by the serious events near at hand, but as the first delegate of China it is my duty to address the assembly on the grave situation in the far east. I feel my task is the more imperative because the present situation in Europe is not unconnected with the war of aggression which has been allowed to continue in Asia. Precisely a year ago I had the honour to invite the attention of the assembly to Japan's invasion of China. It may be recalled that, after careful examination of all the pertinent facts, the eighteenth assembly reached the unanimous conclusion that Japan's action could be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it was in contravention of her obligations under the nine power treaty of Washington and the pact of Paris. By the resolution of October 6, 1937 the assembly—

And he quotes the minute of the assembly—expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of