

4. The group of parties known collectively as the National Democrat party is very influential among the landowners, the lower middle class in the towns, the Roman Catholic clergy, and the youth in general. This applies to the whole of Poland and is especially true of the former Prussian provinces. In the past the National Democrats were more anti-German than anti-Russian and tended to favour an understanding with Russia. What had been to Dmowski a reasoned political doctrine was to his followers more of a tradition or a slogan. But during its whole history of over forty years the National Democrat party has never dreamed of sacrificing to Russia Eastern Galicia, which was one of its main strongholds. For many leading members of the party, the main common interest uniting Poland and Russia was the necessity of preventing the development of an Ukrainian national consciousness. The action of the Soviet Government in invading and occupying Eastern Poland proved an acid test under which the traditional belief that the Russians were much less dangerous neighbours than the Germans evaporated at once. So far as the Polish emigration in the United Kingdom is concerned, some of the most vigorous opposition to General Sikorski's Russian policy has proceeded from National Democrats such as M. Bielecki. Even the National Democrat representatives in the Cabinet (MM. Seyda and Komarnicki) do not disguise their conviction that the Soviet territorial claims are quite unacceptable. To judge by the reports from Poland, the attitude of the National Democrats there is just as uncompromising. There may be a few National Democrats who do not feel very strongly about Wilno; there are none who would renounce Lwów.

5. There is not at present either in Poland or abroad any organised political party claiming to derive from Marshal Pilsudski, but none the less the tradition of the marshal is an element which should not be left entirely out of account. It is very strong among the Poles from North-Eastern Poland and also among the men and women who thirty years ago were young Radical intellectuals, mostly with a Socialist colouring, and both of these classes have their own reasons for distrusting and disliking communism and the Soviet Union. The Pilsudski-ite opposition to General Sikorski's Government has hitherto had its main centre in New York in the group of the "Nowy Swiat," which includes in the person of M. Matuszewski at least one brilliant writer and acute political thinker. What some of the most intelligent and honest former followers of the marshal now in this country thought about Polish-Soviet relations in 1941 was shown by the action of M. Zaleski and General Sosnkowski in resigning from the Cabinet rather than accept the agreement with Russia in the form in which it was put up to the Polish Government.

6. Reverting for a moment to the geographical divisions of the Polish nation mentioned above, we must note that among the Poles in the Middle East, many of whom have not only passed through Russian prisons and penal camps, but have had to leave their families in the U.S.S.R., indignation with the Soviet Government has of late grown so much stronger that General Sikorski may soon have difficulty in keeping it within bounds. The dislike and distrust of Russia which exist among the Polish emigration in the United States are encouraged by the general unpopularity of the Soviet Union in that country. Far the largest and most important geographical section of the nation is that constituted by the Poles who are still in Polish territory or have been deported to the Reich for forced labour. What the Poles in Poland, and especially those in the General Government, feel and think is known in considerable detail from the reports of their emissaries who from time to time arrive in this country. One of these emissaries, who is clearly a very intelligent man, was recently asked by an English friend what would be the attitude of the Poles in Poland towards the Russian armies when and if their westward drive were to bring them into territory which was politically Polish up to September 1939. His reply was that the Poles were much too sensible to demand that any Allied army which was operating successfully against the Germans should suspend its advance when it reached Polish territory. When, however, he was asked what would be the attitude of the Poles towards any territorial concessions to the U.S.S.R., he said that all Poles in Poland, without distinction of party, would resist any attempt to set up a Soviet régime to the west of the Riga frontier and would immediately disown any Government, which, even tacitly, accepted any such attempt. He expanded this statement by saying that, even if they were convinced that Great Britain and America would not help them in the unequal and hopeless struggle against the vast Soviet Union, the Poles would none the less take it up and fight until they were crushed. In doing so they would be moved by a mystical feeling against which considerations of prudence and expediency could not possibly prevail.