

fundamental rights to the majority of the people. Violence in South Africa has continued since the statement produced by the Commonwealth leaders.

We look, as I say, with interest and with—how can I put it—qualified optimism or qualified pessimism about the efficacy of the declaration in getting the Government of South Africa to change its policy in the next six months.

● (1550)

[*Translation*]

Unfortunately, party policies continue to be applied. Canadian men and women would like the Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) to answer the following questions: First, what specific criteria does our Government intend to use to monitor the situation in South Africa and determine whether changes are occurring?

Second, what kind of contingency plans have our Government and those of other Commonwealth countries prepared in case South Africa pursues its apartheid policy?

[*English*]

I would now like to move on to the other subject of great interest and concern to people throughout the world, that is, the general problem of disarmament, the particular problem of nuclear disarmament and, more particular still, the meeting which will take place next month between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

[*Translation*]

The meeting between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev next month in Geneva could be a critical junction point in human history. The world is at a turning point in the fight to slow down the arms race, especially where nuclear weapons are concerned.

Today, Mr. Speaker, the nations of this globe spend as a whole \$1 billion a year for armaments. That would be sufficient to cancel the debt of all Third World countries. It is time to change our priorities.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) has stated that the Geneva Summit represents a unique opportunity which must not be ruined in the search for world peace. He is quite right. He also said that it is time for the United States and the Soviet Union to go a step further.

All Canadian men and women support this statement wholeheartedly. Mr. Speaker, Canada is well-known for its ability to have frank discussions with both superpowers. It is a tradition that we must continue to nourish and cherish. However, it is better cherished and nourished by practical and specific gestures.

I would like the Prime Minister himself to make this further step.

[*English*]

During the summer months I had occasion to visit both Moscow and Washington and to have discussions with the

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chief negotiator of the Soviet Union at the Geneva Talks which took place recently and, back to back with that meeting, to meet with his American equivalent in Washington. While the Prime Minister was meeting with the Commonwealth heads in the Caribbean, I had occasion to take part in an important disarmament meeting in Vienna, attended by a number of Prime Ministers, as well as Party leaders in the Social Democratic movement.

I say to the Prime Minister and to other people in the nation that it seems to me that a framework of agreement is possible. There is an extra concrete step which, I say to the Prime Minister, he could be and should be taking right now. If there is a conclusion which I have drawn from my own meetings in Washington and in Moscow, and from the meetings last week in Vienna, it is that the two superpowers are maintaining for themselves a certain rigidity in two key areas, one for each of them. If it were forcefully presented, with minimal rhetoric, by a number of nations, whether or not they are in the NATO Alliance, there is at least a greater chance an agreement could be reached.

The framework which seems very clear includes the following points. The first is one which the two superpowers ought to share in common, that is, to make an agreement that we now not only have a freeze on the development of more nuclear weapons but that each of them reduce some of their nuclear weaponry. The two superpowers know that the Soviet Union has an advantage in its strike force capacity into certain areas and that the United States has an advantage in certain other areas. They both know—and they have an expertise which we in this country lack—what needs to be done to have a balanced reduction on the part of the United States in certain areas, on the one hand, and on the part of the Soviet Union in other areas, on the other hand. That is to what they have to agree in common. It is not very much, I say, for people with common sense as well as expertise to say at this point in human history that they have to agree to that.

There were two other points repeated in private talks in Washington, Moscow and Vienna. First, the Soviet Union has an obligation, at long last in the history of the discussions of these matters, to say that it will accept on site verification for any announced changes leading to a de-escalation in existing levels of armaments and a commitment not to construct more. The Soviet Union must move from its historic position. Sometimes in the past it has talked about this, but it has been greatly reluctant, to understate it, to accept that kind of verification. Given its strong opposition to the great escalation in spending on star wars, the Soviet Union may well be prepared now to move on that. The Soviets have to be prepared to do that. Second, I say that the United States has to make a specific concession which the Reagan administration has been reluctant to do, that is, as has already been said in the House, to put star wars on the agenda for discussion. What kind of a discussion can there be when one of those coming to the bargaining table says: "We want you to discuss everything, but there is one thing we want left out"?