

Labour Crisis in Aircraft Industry

like to know, because it is of vital importance in regard to this, when will the major threat be nuclear weapons, missiles rather than bombers?

Mr. Pearkes: I can answer that right now. The best military advice we receive is that they will be a major threat by mid-1960.

Mr. Pearson: The minister says the major threat will be by mid-1960 and we are in 1959 now. That is a year and two or three months from now. The major threat will be missiles and bombers would then presumably be a minor threat. But in his statement the Prime Minister said that the major threat will change to missiles by the middle 1960's. On Friday last the Prime Minister said:

It is considered that the defence system of North America is adequate to meet this threat.

That is the bomber threat as it is now. I continue:

Potential aggressors now seem more likely to put their effort into missile development than into increasing their bomber force. By the middle of 1962 the threat from the intercontinental ballistic missile will undoubtedly be greatly enhanced in numbers, size and accuracy, and the ICBM threat may be supplemented by submarine-launched missiles. By the middle sixties—

Not 1960 but by the middle sixties, from 1965 on.

—the missile seems likely to be the major threat and the long range bomber relegated to supplementing the major attack by these missiles.

That, Mr. Speaker, is a very important discrepancy between the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister in the analysis of this vital defence picture. Indeed, over the air on television last Friday the Prime Minister said that by the time the Arrow would be available the missile would be the major threat and because of that the Arrow would be—these were the words he used—“ineffectual and inoperative.” If the Prime Minister was right Friday night and if the Arrow would have been available by 1961, then the Prime Minister could not have been right in this formal statement when he said that the missile would only be the major threat in the middle sixties.

Mr. Fulton: He did not say “only”.

Mr. Pearkes: He said it would be the major threat in the middle sixties.

Mr. Fulton: But he did not say “only” in the middle sixties.

Mr. Pearson: The Minister of National Defence has said that it will be the major threat 15 months from now.

Mr. Pearkes: It will be and it will continue to be the major threat for many years to come.

Mr. Pearson: All right. The words of the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence are on the record and they will speak for themselves. But surely they do underline and emphasize what we are trying to point out here, that there has been confusion, uncertainty and fumbling not only in respect of the decision taken but the reasons for the decision. This is far too important a matter to have that kind of uncertainty.

Now, Mr. Speaker, what is to take the place of the CF-105, the Arrow, in defence against bombers which are now the major threat and will shortly be at least a supplementary or minor threat? In his statement last Friday the Prime Minister said, as found on page 1222 of *Hansard*:

The development of interceptor aircraft that is now proceeding in the United States and abroad is on different types.

“Different types”. Presumably that would seem to explain at least in part why the CF-105 contract was terminated. I wonder whether we can get an answer to the question, what are these different types and are they being considered as alternatives to the CF-105? What new types of manned interceptors can be in the minds of the government as alternatives to the CF-105 and as alternatives to the CF-100 which is now our main defence in the field of manned interceptors against hostile bombers?

The Prime Minister said in his statement and the Minister of National Defence repeated it this afternoon that the CF-100 is still an effective weapon in the defence of North America and that presumably it can do the job so far as hostile jet bombers are concerned. If that is the case, why is it then that we are not manufacturing any more CF-100's? What happens when we run out of CF-100's? They are effective to do the job now and no provision is being made for a manned interceptor to take the place of the CF-100. But the minister was not quite as optimistic and encouraging about the effectiveness of the CF-100 when he spoke to the committee on July 6 last. As found on page 337 of the committee proceedings he is reported as saying with regard to this plane:

In a few years' time it may become obsolete, but at the present time . . . the CF-100 is capable of meeting and engaging the majority of the bombers which Russia might have available to attack this country.

Not capable of shooting down Russian bombers but capable of engaging the majority of Russian bombers which might attack this country. That does not give you the impression that the CF-100 in its present form is capable of dealing with the most