

of the nuclear option by non-nuclear states, give a firm undertaking to embark upon specific measures of nuclear-arms control -- such as an agreement to reduce or at least to freeze their holdings of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, a comprehensive test ban, and a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. I am not suggesting that the nuclear powers consider measures which will, in the last analysis, disturb or upset the stability resulting from the present nuclear stalemate, but I am suggesting that, in the interests of maintaining that stability, they should be prepared to accept some reduction in strategic offensive forces. I should further suggest that United States-Soviet disagreement on what would be a reasonable and fair concession, carried to the point of frustrating the negotiation and general acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty, might, like some of the other issues I have already mentioned, do greater long-term harm to their own and everyone's security through the loss of the present opportunity to take the first and essential concrete step towards nuclear-arms control.

We are all aware of the "Plowshare" programme in the United States. We should probably not all agree -- in fact, I understand even the sponsors of the programme do not all agree -- on the economic benefits that "Plowshare" may yield in future. Indeed, while recognizing the possible future benefits of this programme, some of us are concerned about its effects on current attempts to curb nuclear proliferation. There is, I should suggest, evidence to support the view that the Plowshare programme tends to encourage non-nuclear states to want to develop this capability for themselves. There is increasing evidence to suggest that countries with a real nuclear potential will not easily accept the argument -- with which we in Canada agree -- that because nuclear bombs and peaceful nuclear explosions are indistinguishable, the present non-nuclear countries should surrender in perpetuity their access to a technology which holds promise of significant future benefit. What is the answer? We should suggest that the United States might be frank and specific about the undertakings they have already expressed in general terms by agreeing to a suitable article in the non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, the time may have come when the nuclear powers might consider whether an increasing role in the direction and management of the Plowshare programme might not be vested in the IAEA or some similar international body. Of course, this would be on the condition that the nuclear powers retain full control of the explosive technology involved.

On each of these points I have mentioned on the relation between horizontal and vertical proliferation and between obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear signatories to a non-proliferation treaty, the Canadian position is not fully in accord with that of the United States. We feel that the United States and its nuclear colleagues should be prepared to go beyond the cautious commitments, hedged by an understandable concern for their own interests, which I might recall some non-nuclear states have labelled as the arrogance of power. As we are now witnessing around the world, great-power hegemony no longer works as it did in the nineteenth century; the current Middle Eastern crisis provides eloquent testimony to this. We do not maintain that such commitments need be part of a non-proliferation treaty. In fact, we are concerned lest the attachment of complicated conditions to a treaty make it impossible to negotiate at all. However, there is no reason why the nuclear powers could not undertake,