In brief, Table 12 assumes that the present preponderance of SLBMs in the American strategic deployment is maintained though not quite to the same degree as previously. With 360 SLBM launchers, the US is able to maintain a large number of sea-based warheads, but it might be noted that the transition to the 24-tube Trident submarine leaves the United States with still fewer ballistic missile submarines. The American decision to move to the larger Trident submarines may well become an issue in the context of force reductions, since the greater power of the Trident submarine must be set off against the ability of the opponent to apply increasing anti-submarine (ASW) warfare resources against each individual submarine target.

In regard to ICBMs, it can be seen that a mixed force of MIRVed Minuteman III Mark 12A and MX missilies can be combined with a mixed force of single warhead Minuteman II and Midgetman single warhead missiles. Clearly Midgetman missiles could be increased in order to come closer to the launcher ceiling and complicate the counterforce targeting of the opponent. However, this would require a corresponding reduction in SLBM warheads in order to maintain the 4500 ceiling. Equally, the Midgetman could be substituted for the older Minuteman II, but, of course, at great expense.

Table 13 demonstrates the effect of the exercise on Soviet strategic forces. In this case the balance of ICBM and SLBM forces is reversed, so that the Soviets retain the preponderance of ICBM forces which characterizes their present force structure. Modernization permits them to deploy the SS-N-23 MIRVed launcher on submarines. More importantly, however, the introduction of the SS-25 mobile ICBM allows them to deploy a much larger number of launchers while still adhering to the 3,000 warhead sub-ceiling. A mixed force of SS-18s, mobile SS-24s, and SS-25s gives the Soviets a plausible force structure after modernization, allowing them to meet the warhead ceiling and sub-ceiling while deploying a sizeable number of launchers.