

Safeguards-Supply Linkages

1. Linkages between safeguards and supply of materials may both support and hinder safeguards. Safeguards may be required as a condition for supply, and the acceptance of safeguards may also be taken as implicitly guaranteeing access. Improved access for those who accept safeguards may encourage acceptance of safeguards, but it may also complicate efforts to upgrade safeguards requirements, or efforts to implement measures based on a "latent proliferation" definition of the basic non-proliferation problem.
2. The duality of function in the Agency — its role as a technical assistance body as well as a verification body — blurs its objectives and complicates its structures and functioning. The competition between the two functions for resources exacerbates the division of the membership into different constituencies according to the functions they value. It might be more desirable to structure an organization around a single, well-defined function, and to assign other functions to it only if they are clearly secondary and supportive of the primary function.

The Political Support Base

1. While supplier support is needed for an effective control system over exports, too great a dependence on supplier power may create difficulties, not only because of problems of co-ordination and undercutting as the number of suppliers increases but also because the rights and interest of recipients must be taken into account. An organization including both recipients and suppliers may allow desirable co-ordination within and among these groups, with greater legitimacy for a safeguards system as a result. However, it may also hinder the use or effective implementation of a "latent proliferation" problem definition. This encourages action outside the organization, which in turn may create political strains. The alternative, however, may be a diluted or less technically effective safeguards system.
2. The detailed specification of a verification system in a founding document may present advantages of clarity in the obligations at the start. However, it may also hinder the evolution of a verification system in response to changing problems, techniques, and scope of application. All of these factors could generate a multiplicity of systems within and outside the agency, reducing its coherence, legitimacy and centrality.
3. The Agency has profited from the existence of a broad presumption against the spread of nuclear weapons. The limitations of this consensus have also indicated sore points in the politics of the safeguards system and in the control regime more generally.