

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

or however we may characterize it, it stands as the ultimate safety net of the convention - the final means under the convention whereby a State party can seek assurance that other States parties remain in full compliance with their obligations.

Notwithstanding the well-understood apprehensions of some negotiators, we are also convinced that a highly intrusive challenge inspection régime - one that includes access to any site and which ensures that, if it so wishes, the State initiating the inspection process may be represented during it by the presence of an observer - can be made to work without unduly compromising those concerns. In this respect, we have noted the recent statements of Mr. Waldegrave, of the United Kingdom, and the paper he introduced (CD/1012) reporting on his country's experiences in conducting national trial challenge inspections. We also have noted the statement of Ambassador von Wagner, of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 7 August, in which he introduced paper CD/1026. While we recognize that the results of the United Kingdom national trial inspections and those of similar trial inspections elsewhere may not be accepted by some as conclusive, they are highly instructive and offer a concrete basis upon which negotiators can more knowledgeably approach the remaining difficulties with this aspect of the verification issue.

But even when we have satisfactorily resolved the challenge inspection issue, Canada still believes that the verification system for the convention would require additional measures if it is to be effective, measures which would go beyond those of article VI and which would enable the international inspectorate to inspect undeclared facilities, but without invoking the full panoply of article IX: in short, ad hoc verification.

To our minds, ad hoc verification provides the means whereby the international inspectorate can, in a routine manner and with the minimum necessary amount of intrusiveness, periodically "sample" the activities of undeclared facilities and thereby ensure that there are no activities going on at such facilities that would threaten the purposes of the convention. From this perspective, ad hoc verification should not be seen as a substitute for or an extension of challenge inspection; rather, it complements the régime by providing another needed component for effective verification.

We regret that this summer's discussions have revealed that, despite what we had thought were clear explanations of both the Australian paper (CD/CW/WP.286) of 11 April and the United States working paper (CD/CW/WP.300) of 27 June, there is still a considerable amount of concern and uncertainty about what ad hoc verification would involve. We hope that during the next few months, particularly in the intersessional discussions, we and other supporters of the concept will be able to better explain both our reasons for recommending it and its implications. At the same time, we would expect that other negotiators will approach further discussions on this issue with an open and constructive mind.