

in the war between Iran and Iraq. On the basis of this report it must be assumed that one side to the conflict has indeed used chemical weapons. The Federal Government has stated its position on these occurrences publicly, and in an unequivocal manner. It regrets and condemns the use of chemical weapons as a clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of such weapons in war. The findings of the United Nations mission underline, once more, the vital importance of the early conclusion of a comprehensive world-wide and reliably verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

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I would therefore limit myself now to reiterating the deep regret of my delegation that the important proposal concerning the verification of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, introduced by Ambassador Issraelyan on 21 February has not been matched by a similar move on the part of western countries, especially the United States. Its draft convention, introduced on 18 April, failed to bring about such a constructive step. Moreover, while not moving an inch towards the positions of other countries, the draft raised new unfounded requirements especially in the field of verification. The authors of the concept of "open invitation" not only realized but undoubtedly proceeded from its obvious unacceptability for many countries. It is politically naive to assume that States would be seriously prepared to open, on 24-hours notice, all their military installations, including those of strategic significance, to international inspectors looking at random for "hidden" chemical weapons. We believe that this fully applies also to the United States itself.

The United States draft convention is also somehow behind what has been achieved so far in the Conference on Disarmament. For example, the definition of "toxic chemical" used is scientifically unacceptable, using the term "chemical action" which is unknown to toxicologists throughout the world. The definition of precursors is related only to production which does not imply its use as component of binary or multicomponent weapon technology. We also miss a definition of key precursor. Instead one can only find an incomplete and arbitrary list of such compounds scattered in schedules A and C.

The concept of lists without definitions and the effort to relate various measures only to lists, as reflected also in the article dealing with permitted activities, is unacceptable for my delegation. We are convinced that at the time of signing the Convention, there must be a clear and binding line, which can be drawn only by means of definitions which are scientifically based, delimited by the purpose-criterion limited and concisely elaborated.

Binary chemical weapons have traditionally been a taboo subject in the United States newspapers. But it is still surprising that they are still ignored even in a comprehensive draft convention. At least in this regard, the United States draft is "consistent". This is very much apparent from schedule A, where the most dangerous chemicals are said to be summarized. We maintain that such a schedule should contain also all key precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals, which, in the United States draft, it does not. For instance, the key precursor of the most toxic contemporary super-toxic lethal nerve agent forming a substantive part of the United States chemical arsenal, VX, that is, O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphinite, has been "forgotten".

The draft convention is also lacking in its undifferentiated approach to destruction, with no schedule of destruction according to the danger of particular elements of chemical weapons aimed at avoiding one-sided military advantage during the destruction period.

With regard to old chemical weapons, this proposal conserves also the anachronistic