

- (2) Numerical Freeze on Dual Capable Launch Platforms and Delivery Vehicles. Special training, communications, operations and security measures accompany nuclear certified units into the field making moderate to high confidence verification of these systems possible. LRINF missile deployments can be monitored by reconnaissance aircraft as well as electronic listening posts. A common database might be set up by the US and USSR and maximum allowable weapons load counting rules could be developed to ease verification. ALCMs can be monitored with high confidence by examining the aircraft on which they are deployed especially if counting rules like those of SALT II are adopted. SLCMs could be restricted to those ships which are identified as having a nuclear role at the time of the freeze.
- (3) Delivery Vehicle Test Freeze. A set of percentage differences between old and new missile size and performance criteria could be used which could be monitored with high confidence by satellites, ground-based stations, and aircraft. A limit on the number of tests could similarly be monitored.
- (4) Comprehensive Test Ban. The paper reviews the agreement reached by the Carter Administration with the USSR and the UK which included unmanned seismic monitors in each country integrated into a world wide seismic monitoring network. Other US collection systems including satellites, underwater sensors and atmospheric sampling aircraft also would be used. On-site inspections would be allowed in cases of doubt. A CTB would be adequately verifiable.
- (5) Ballistic Missile Production Freeze. The US national intelligence system has amassed much knowledge concerning the Soviet ballistic missile production system. This in conjunction with current monitoring capabilities would permit verification of the shutdown of production plants. Voluntary data exchanges and on-site inspection might also be used to alleviate suspicions.
- (6)&(7) Nuclear Warhead and Weapons-grade Materials Production Ban:
A ban on nuclear warhead production could be implemented and verified along the same lines as the missile production ban. During the warhead production moratorium, IAEA safeguards agreements would be negotiated for all nuclear facilities and materials stockpiles. The CTB system of "voluntary inspections" to resolve suspicions could be used as well.

The paper includes a detailed table relating the monitoring tasks involved in verifying elements of the proposed freeze, on the one hand, to the intelligence systems that would be useful for verification, on the other.