

It was precisely on this issue that the lines were drawn in the UN debates. The US and the West Europeans rejected the claim that there was parity. The argument was made that a freeze would codify the existing imbalance, prevent NATO from redressing that imbalance, and eliminate any incentive for the Soviet Union to remove the threat posed by the SS-20's to Western Europe. The Belgian spokesman, for example, observed at the 1984 session that the freeze could not be accepted "especially when one country holds a monopoly on a particularly destructive type of weapon which poses a threat to my country's security." The West German statement noted that Soviet nuclear and conventional forces had reached new heights "precisely during the years in which [it] has made the freeze proposal one of the main battlehorses of its widely publicized policies."

The outcome of each UN debate, therefore, was that, although the freeze votes passed by a wide margin, they were opposed by most of the NATO partners with the exceptions normally of Denmark, Iceland and Greece and occasionally of the Netherlands, Norway and Spain. Moreover, although it was understandable that general debates would not cover the technical questions of verification, it was notable that little or no effort was made to explore the question of the balance of nuclear forces. It was not the 'window of vulnerability' (which had so exercised President Reagan in 1981) that was said to be the source of the imbalance, but, simply put, the Soviet deployment of the SS-20's in Europe.

A second argument made by the United States tied the problems of verification to the utility of the comprehensive freeze as a timely palliative to the arms race. The proponents of a comprehensive freeze had never argued that the freeze was an end in itself, but rather a necessary first step to negotiations aimed at the *reduction* of nuclear arsenals. Such a first step is most plausible if it can be done, for example, as the Mexican/Swedish and Indian resolutions required, by a declaratory act. Emphasizing the complexity of the verification procedures which would need to be in place before the freeze was declared, the United States argued that a freeze would be "every bit as difficult to negotiate as arms reductions themselves; indeed, such a complete ban on production, development and deployment of new systems could prove even more difficult than complex negotiations on the reduction of arms. . . ." This argument tends to be self-fulfilling and is taken up in the next section.

One final note on the UN debates deserves attention. Australia and New Zealand, who are formally allied to the United States through the ANZUS pact, both voted *against* the freeze resolutions in 1982: in 1983 New Zealand voted against, and Australia ab-

stained; in 1984 Australia voted in *favour*, and New Zealand abstained; in 1985 both countries voted in favour. In the Australian explanation of vote, an attempt was made to support "the broad aspirations manifest in the freeze proposals." At the same time, the Australian Government insisted that "verification, mutuality and balance" were essential elements of a freeze, and pre-conditions to "resolving the central issue of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe." Australia, therefore, supported the principle of the freeze, but indicated that it should not take place before the resolution of the problems indicated. Although there is in this position an element of having one's cake and eating it, the Australians did effectively register their serious misgivings about current trends in nuclear weapons developments, and did not exempt the United States from their skepticism. Effectively, this distanced them from the Canadian government, for example, which expressed no such misgivings in any of its UN statements.

Canada voted against the comprehensive freeze proposals at the United Nations. In the explanation of vote at the 1983 Assembly, the Canadian delegate recognized "the important symbolic value in the freeze concept as an expression of the desire of mankind to be free from the fear of nuclear war" but also noted: "[Canada] wants significant, balanced and verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear arms in the world . . . mere declarations of a freeze are not a meaningful response to this danger . . . Canada wants the present levels reduced by the immediate unconditional resumption of negotiations on reductions." Although many Canadian policies could be construed as supporting partial freezes, perhaps the clearest and most consistent Canadian position has been that in support of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). This support was reaffirmed by Mr. Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the 40th Session of the General Assembly in September 1985:

" . . . for Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding objective. Our aim is to stop all nuclear testing."

CENTRAL ISSUES IN THE FREEZE DEBATE

The proposals for a comprehensive freeze were above all an attempt to administer a psychological and political jolt to the protagonists in the arms race, and to the complex, even arcane processes of the arms control debates. But beyond this, the freeze required for its success acceptance of its reasonable-