insanity must amount to such an alienation of reason that the prisoner did not know the nature or quality of the act which he committed, or if he did know the nature and quality of the act, was in such a state of mind that he did not know it was wrong. If, however, the prisoner had the mental capacity to know that his act was contrary to law, and that he was breaking the law he was responsible. The jury returned a verdict of "culpable homicide" by a majority of one, and the prisoner was sentenced to penal servitude for life.

A leading Scottish newspaper (the Glasgow Herald) commented as follows:—"It is hardly possible to avoid comparing the verdict arrived at in the Edinburgh case with that in the Glasgow case. In the Glasgow case the counsel for the accused did not put in a plea of insanity, their contention being that the shooting was the result of an accident. In the Edinburgh case the counsel for the accused contented themselves with pleading insanity, yet the one was declared insane and was treated as a lunatic, and the other was found guilty and sentenced to penal servitude for life. When judges disagree how is justice to be obtained." (Claister's Medical Jurisprudence.)

In the celebrated Crippen case the medical evidence for the crown was given with a "scientific exactitude, lucidity, succintness and absolute fairness hard to improve." The evidence for the defence was also particularly able, and possibly not less scientific, yet the impression made at the time can possibly best be summed up in the words of the British Medical Journal, "The ethics of the question are of so difficult a kind that until they have been more thoroughly ventilated and discussed, no one is entitled, whether openly or in his own heart, to condemn another man for taking an opposite view to his own, whatever that may be, or for acting in accordance with that view. Meantime we merely deplore the conditions which allow such unfortunate conflicts between medical witnesses to occur, and do so not only because they tend to interfere with the dignity of medicine, but because, more important still, the underlying conditions may at any time easily lead to grave miscarriage of justice. We therefore hold, as has long been held by most medical men who have considered the subject, that it would be greatly to the advantage of the public, and to the administration of justice, if, in trials of a medical kind, the scientific evidence presented to the court were not that of an individual, but of a majority of medical men asked by the Crown to consider the medical points at issue."

It is interesting and valuable to note that in many nations statutory enactments have been passed giving effect to the modern conception of medico-legal jurisprudence. In the State of New York, Laws 1910, an act to amend the code of criminal procedure in relation to procedure when a person in confinement appears to be insane—"If any person