

while an appendix, indicating the practical policy at the present juncture prompted by the principles here advocated, has been added. The reprinted matter comprised in the last five chapters (or rather from page 105, to be verbally precise) has been left exactly as it appeared in the *ante-bellum* editions of "The Great Illusion." Not a word has been altered, and portions will consequently now read somewhat curiously. The reader will appreciate the reasons that have prompted me to leave the matter in these chapters unchanged, just as it was written years ago.

Had I been writing those chapters now, there are certain details, but not many, that would have been modified. However the form of statement of the case for Civilism as against Militarism might have been varied, the outstanding conclusion and the general thesis by which it is supported remain absolutely unaffected—as valid as ever. The broad principles elaborated here are not one whit less true because estimates formed years since as to the manner of their working—given rather as illustrations than as forecasts—do not in a world-wide war correspond in every detail to the event. To have made any pretension that they would (and I, happily, made no such prediction) would have been to put the study of sociology on the plane, not of a science, but of astrology and crystal-gazing, to enter upon a field more fittingly left to Old Moore's Almanac. "The Great Illusion" was not a prophecy; it was, as its subtitle indicates, "a study of the relation of military power to national advantage." The result of that study was the conclusion that a war of conquest and subjugation waged by one European nation against another, however successful from the military point of view, must prove, in terms of the

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