

Making the user pay

focus on defence and deterrence. A package of various benefits would be offered.

On joining the scheme signatories would be given access to the training programs of an ICWA CW Defence Center. Teams would be trained in the use of protective equipment and defensive techniques on the CW battlefield. Civil defence courses would also be offered. "Starter kits" for CW defence would be provided. The intention of these preparations is to enable signatories to absorb a full range of defensive equipment in an emergency.

Preventive action

In a situation of impending danger, but where CW had not yet been used, there would be an initial dispatch of defensive material, such as gas masks and antidotes, by the authority to the signatory. This would send a strong deterrent signal to the potential user, who would have tangible evidence that his victim did not stand alone. Furthermore, the supply of equipment would necessarily change the aggressor's calculations: surprise would have been forfeited and there would be a much reduced chance of his obtaining battlefield advantage. Other deterrent signals could be the ostentatious dispatch of an observer team, pre-positioning of remote CW sensing devices, and the carrying out of an airlift exercise.

In the event of an attack, any ICWA signatory would be able to request immediate, automatic on-site investigation by the Authority's inspection teams. Following verification, the terms of the insurance policy would automatically come into effect. A full range of defensive equipment would be supplied to the insured victim. This would include gas masks, protective clothing, decontamination gear and the medical materials needed to treat casualties. Evidence suggests that an army, well trained in and supplied with defensive means, has much less to fear from CW than a defenceless victim. And even if an aggressor achieved initial surprise, he would not be permitted to press home his advantage.

Other provisions would include the dispatch of fully-equipped field hospitals and medical teams; the transformation of inspection teams into observers in civilian areas; the provision of appropriate compensation to the victim, including financial aid; the supply of conventional military equipment to the signa-

tory to nullify any offensive advantage which the aggressor might have obtained.

Conclusion

When Ethiopia was attacked with poison gas by Italy in 1935-36 it found little comfort in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Instead, Haile Selassie appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross "for gas masks and instruction manuals for their use." More recently, Pakistan, which borders on both Afghanistan and Iran, has been concerned with practical, not theoretical, measures. In 1987 it proposed that states supporting a CW Convention should agree to provide assistance, *including protection for both civilians and military forces*, to states threatened by the spread of chemical weapons. It also proposed that collective penalties, such as trade embargoes, be imposed on CW proliferators and users.

Pakistan's proposals help highlight the increasingly sharp differences between the West's and the Third World's concepts of CW. The dominant Third World view is that CWs are militarily effective weapons which, as the Arab bloc emphasized at the Paris Conference, are neither more, nor less, objectionable than nuclear arms. The peculiar Western abhorrence of chemical weapons — "this hellish poison," in Churchill's graphic phrase — which originated in the traumatic experience of the First World War, is not necessarily shared by Third World nations. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, the use or non-use of CW in the Third World will be governed by the normal strategic calculus of costs versus benefits. For these reasons most major Third World military powers may be reluctant to accept a CW Convention which simply mirrors Western assumptions.

If Third World states are to forego chemical weapons, they will have to be provided with tangible benefits. Help, not exhortation, is what they require. The CW genie is now out of the bottle. If, as the evidence strongly suggests, prohibition is no longer a viable option, the need for effective controls becomes increasingly urgent. The creation of an appropriate international authority of the kind suggested here may be the most realistic method of meeting the problem. It offers a middle way between unachievable prohibition and uncontrollable proliferation, and so should appeal to the Canadian foreign policy tradition. □