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(c) Finally it might be decided that Canada's most valuable contribution to the global war, would be to move all of the Canadian Troops to the Pacific front, after the collapse of Germany, without the reorganization necessary for us to assist in occupation during Stage II. In other words, it might be held that the operational aspect of the Pacific war zone should take precedence over a possible long term political aspect of maintaining a united front in the Armies of Occupation.

6. Conclusion - In summing up the pros and cons there would seem to be little doubt on balance that we should form some part of the Armies of Occupation. The very valid objection outlined in para. 5(a), must be taken into consideration, but provided that the Canadian Army of Occupation is formed from volunteers who would be enrolled in the permanent active army of Canada, and (b) that it is the intention to maintain a larger standing army, better equipped, and with a larger scope in Canada in the future, the objection under this heading disappears.

7. As long as the Pacific war carries on, the question of the Army of Occupation really offers no problem, as it is strictly an operational matter. As, however, there is every likelihood that Stage II will extend past the end of the war with Japan, steps would have to be taken as soon as the war ends with Germany to make up the occupying forces from volunteers interested in adopting the Army as a career.

8. With reference to the question brought up in para. 5(c), certainly the easiest and most effective means of Canada assisting in the Pacific war would be to move complete units (not decimated by volunteers for the Army of Occupation) to that area. However, the extent of our participation in the garrisoning of Germany would not be large (outlined in Part II), so that the reorganization would not be too drastic. In any case, it is possible that due to the different terrain and method of warfare in the Pacific zone, considerable reorganization will have to be effected. This is, however, a matter of operational policy, but it is felt that the slight gain from the operational point of view of not participating in the occupying forces is more than outweighed by the loss in the long term political considerations as outlined in para. 4.

## PART II

9. Assuming then, that Canadian forces will form part of the Army of Occupation, there remains the question of the extent of contribution and the length of time that the contribution should be maintained.

10. During Stage II, the P.H.P. plan, para. 37(a)(VIII) considers that the following British land forces will be required to police the British zone (North-West Germany).

11 Divisions, of which one should be organized for Air Transport, including a proportion of paratroops (which might be held in reserve in the U.K.).

7 Armoured Car Regiments, and  
the necessary non-divisional units.

It is visualized (P.H.P. plan, para. 37(a)(i) and (ii)) that the control would be exercised by stationing Bde Groups with a squadron of Armoured Cars attached, about strategic centres throughout the zone, backed by a central reserve of

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