U.N. casualties so far had been slight. U Thant's reaction to the statement of the Canadian position – the need to find a moderate solution and to exercise restraint – was that this was precisely his own position as well. He confirmed that he was determined that the eventual solution should be found in political negotiations rather than in military action. Concerning political negotiations the Secretariat had already made the decision to deal with Tshombe at the right moment, not to ignore him nor attempt to crush him.

3. Regarding U.N. military plans, U Thant was reluctant to be specific. He said that there was no overall plan to occupy by force key centres in Katanga although circumstances might arise that might make this necessary. However, no such instructions to the U.N. Commander had been issued and assurances to that effect had been given to the Belgian Foreign Minister earlier in the day.

N.A. R[OBERTSON]

7. DEA/6386-40

L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 32

Washington, January 4, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our Tel 15 Jan 2.†

Repeat for Information: CCOS Ottawa, DND Ottawa (OpImmediate) from Ottawa,

London, Permis New York, NATO Paris, Paris, Brussels, Rome (Priority).

By Bag Tel Aviv, Leopoldville, Accra, Lagos, Yaounde, Delhi, Karachi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Dublin, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen from London.

CONGO: ANC RETRAINING AND REORGANIZATION SCHEME

This morning we attended State Department Meeting at which Whitehouse of Congo Desk and Colonel Greene of USA Army³ (not repeat not Air Force as previously reported) outlined further steps which had been taken towards implementation of retraining and reorganization scheme for Congolese Armed Forces. Others attending were representatives of British, Belgian and Italian Embassies and of AID. Although there was a new reference to Norway as a possible participant in scheme no repeat no Norwegian representative attended: we were told later that their involvement was a new idea and that State Department would be having initial discussions with them separately. We were also told that USA has shelved Israeli participation at least temporarily on political grounds.

2. Apart from bringing us up to date Whitehouse described purposes of meeting as (a) to alert our countries to likelihood that formal requests would be forthcoming from UN within next few weeks to participate in scheme and (b) to encourage possible participants to study the programme with a view to deciding in advance what portions they would be interested in undertaking. Meeting did not repeat not discuss recent events in Katanga but it was noted they might further delay discussions on implementation of scheme. Whitehouse also thought that trend of events seemed to reinforce need to develop ANC as a stabilizing factor. He repeated.

³ Voir/See Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Vol. XX (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), document 268 n. 4.