

*Committee on Defence Expenditure*

by having to concentrate on one small non-combatant branch of one service. The Currie report has been made. The facts are known. The report deals with a series of matters and has some serious implications, yet the sums admitted by the minister are small compared with the over-all cost of defence which approximates \$2 billion this year.

The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) complained that to provide guards for a place like Farnham would cost a great deal more than the value of the place so guarded. Now, he has admitted that the Currie report established defections of some \$50,000. Actually Mr. Currie, in his report, stated that the amount of defection and thievery could not be adequately and completely calculated, and it might be greatly in excess of this.

Let us assume that the minister admits the \$50,000. He is sending this report, which is past history and every word of which has been investigated, to the defence committee. The defence committee sits once a day. The cost of one sitting of this parliament is in the neighbourhood of \$10,000. Therefore to send this report to the defence committee is to add at least \$10,000 a day to the cost of the investigation. Now, Mr. Speaker, a similar situation might be the case of a man who has had a bad accident. He has a broken leg, a ruptured appendix, a coronary thrombosis, a blood clot on the brain, a gunshot wound in his back, and an ingrown toenail. When the doctor comes, the doctor deals with the ingrown toenail first. Something similar to that is being done by sending the Currie report to this committee.

Mr. Currie mentioned also the case of military security. It is impossible to place a dollars and cents value on military security. When a department store loses goods from its warehouse, there is a finite and calculable value of the goods lost. The theft of a piece of military equipment, which may have little or no commercial value, could disclose methods which our armed services intend to use in combat as well as the type of equipment to be employed. If information like this is compromised it may cost the lives of many Canadian servicemen, and also the loss of a future major operation. It is quite wrong, therefore, to regard military security only as a dollars and cents matter.

It is useless to say that security cannot be provided. The atomic energy commission in Chalk River has provided adequate security, and the area is extremely large. I am convinced also that no one but an atomic scientist could obtain much useful information from Chalk River. However, a 15-year-old boy picking up a proximity fuse, an unexploded bomb, a guided missile or a new type of shell,

[Mr. Adamson.]

could quite easily give our enemies a great deal of information about our production methods and the type of weapons we were using.

War is a hideous waste, but this waste of our capital and materials becomes even more hideous if it does not produce the sinews of war which will enable our men to fight and win. To fight and not win is far worse than not fighting at all. Let us look, therefore, at our arms production and particularly our production of aircraft.

The policy of the Canadian government with regard to air is a purely defensive one. It is Canadian policy not to have bombers but to concentrate on interceptors and fighters. This decision takes into consideration our industrial capabilities, and possibly has some merit. With the cost of some of the new bombers being as great as pre-war battleships, it would probably place too great a strain upon our economy to expect Canada to produce large numbers of the latest type bombers. Yet the logistics of the decision could, I feel, have been profitably discussed by the chief of the air staff or his technical officers with the defence committee. If we are, therefore, producing an air force which, apart from an anti-submarine section, has the sole function of stopping enemy bombers, we had better look at the sort of job we are doing.

Our defence is based on two aircraft, the F-86 Sabre and the CF-100, both of which are good aeroplanes. According to a press story this week the F-86 is being produced at the rate of approximately forty a month at the Canadair plant in Montreal. The CF-100, we are told, was to be produced by this time, that is January, 1953, at the rate of twenty a month at the Avro plant at Malton. The production figures for the Sabre have been made known and published, but not those for the CF-100. What I think the committee should know is how many CF-100's have actually been produced and are being produced per month at this time. Have we, in fact, produced twenty from the production line—not from the special hand-tooled assembly line, but from the actual production line? There can be no question of security here as the figure for the Sabre is given quite openly in the press. The only reason for withholding the information with regard to the CF-100 can be that the production figures are shocking.

There is an even more serious question in the matter of production, and that is the question of effectiveness. The modern bombers such as the Avro 698 or the new Boeing or the other United Kingdom type called the Monarch are all capable of speeds approaching that of sound. Their effective operational