

We could not break these links even if we desired, and we would be very foolish if we tried.

Our ties with Great Britain and France have a very special character, evolving from history and tradition and race. We have with them a family relationship of a kind which is easy to feel but hard to describe. It has been driven deep into our national consciousness, into our peoples' feelings. We Canadians have stood side by side with the people of our two mother countries in dark and dangerous days, in 1914 and 1915; in 1939 and 1940; days when, if they had failed or faltered, freedom throughout the world would have fallen.

We may differ with them - as we have recently in the Suez crisis - not on principles and objectives, but on their methods in trying to solve a particular problem of foreign policy. But our distress when we feel we must so differ makes us all the more conscious of the necessity of keeping those differences to the irreducible minimum.

Canadians feel almost the same distress when there are difficulties and divisions between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other; the more so because we know that this kind of difference can have far-reaching consequences from which only the enemies of peace can benefit.

You will realize, then, how strongly we in Canada feel about co-operation between the three great Western powers, in and out of NATO.

Fortunately, such a structure of co-operation does not have to be built from bare ground. There are strong ties between these three countries that existed long before NATO - ties of culture, of blood, and of partnership in war - which we must work hard to strengthen.

This work of building Atlantic unity, however, is not for Governments alone, but for every citizen of all the Atlantic nations. It lays a duty on each of us to try out best to understand the national attitudes, the national problems, and even the national prejudices of our NATO partners; and to keep constantly in mind the over-riding compelling need for working together.

We have had recently in the Middle East an unhappy, indeed an alarming demonstration of what may occur when co-operation breaks down among the three major members of the Atlantic alliance. I have no intention of going into the record of the divergence of policy that occurred there, but it would be pointless, even harmful, to pretend that it did not happen. We have to face the fact that despite all hopeful progress toward closer unity in recent years, NATO was badly shaken by an important disagreement among certain of its members on the best way of dealing with a critical situation. It is,