

Subsequent HROs in Cambodia, Haiti, and Guatemala built upon the El Salvador model albeit in an ad hoc way, with DPA being the office of primary responsibility. Senior DPA staff have made it quite clear that they are happy to remain the office of primary responsibility for human rights field operations.⁹¹ The exception to this DPA leadership has been the HRO in Rwanda, which was created and managed by the High Commission for Human Rights (HCHR) and the Centre for Human Rights.⁹²

The Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) raised and at the same time largely refuted the advisability of any imminent shifting of responsibility for HROs away from DPA, and certainly not outside of UNNY⁹³. The Rwandan crisis demonstrated quite conclusively that the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights, were not particularly adept at mounting a large field operation⁹⁴ nor even in getting others to help them⁹⁵. There were belated moves by the HCHR and the Centre in late 1995, over a year after HRFOR's inception, to draw upon expertise and help from other parts of the UN. However, there continue to be numerous signals from both long term staff and senior newcomers to HRFOR, that the HCHR/Centre's ability to deploy future HROs has not improved appreciably, and will not improve over the short to medium term.

Both the High Commissioner and the Centre must take a much higher profile role where there is a UN field operation, without going so far as to mount their own HRO. Even senior staff within the Centre and the office of the High Commissioner have cautioned against the Centre attempting to create a field operations capacity, not least of all because of the lack of a field operations culture in the Centre. The same argument would hold for the office of the High

⁹¹ It is also indicative that in early 1995 the Electoral Assistance Division moved from DPKO to DPA.

⁹² Another possible exception was in the Former Yugoslavia which was not a full blown HRO but more of a support mechanism for a Special Rapporteur. The *Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia* was authorized by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR Res 1992/S-2/1) and the GA (Res. 46/242 25 Aug. 1992) to set up a field operation that by June 1995 had 9 professional staff, 5 local staff, and 4 regional offices. This was a dramatic departure for the CHR and augurs well for increased resources for special rapporteurs (It was repeated in March 1993 for the Special Rapporteur for Iraq). In light of the immensity of the situation facing the UN in the former Yugoslavia, that field operation was not nearly of the same category of UN response as has occurred in Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, and Guatemala. One would hope that special rapporteurs in the future will consistently have such field capacity when appropriate, but that is different from what this study refers to as a Human Rights Operation (HRO).

⁹³ Probably in light of events surrounding Rwanda, the Secretary-General's recently expressed view is that all UN secretariat field operations should be conducted from UN headquarters in New York.

⁹⁴ See p. 20, *Haiti: Learning the Hard Way*, Lawyers Committee 1995 op cit., when talking about the Expert Mission put together by DPA to plan the Haitian HRO, "It is frankly inconceivable that a team of this quality would have been assembled - and so speedily - at the initiative of the Centre for Human Rights."

⁹⁵ A number of contacts within UNHCR and the Centre for Human Rights talked about UNHCR individuals having been prepared and having offered to assist the Centre in the mounting of the Rwanda field operation, but that such assistance was almost totally ignored. Some in the Centre mentioned being just too busy to be able to ask for help from UNHCR just 5 minutes walk away.