

attendants of all concep-
atmosphere of doubt into
senses, sustain two
The nature of these rela-

that of excitement and
in the relation of excite-
a the relation of assur-
respecting the subjective
th knowledge.

State. Through it, all
on. However powerful
appropriate gratifica-
through this medium, a
of the raging elements
o feed, and helplessly
ing and its appropriate
on, irrespective of the
composition of the Will
consent can never be
have been deliberately

d never yields to the
vinced that they have
refere with the general

mere executive power
deed, something of a
the assistance of
the has the strongest
The despot may will
y section of his sub-
a weak motive, or to
ive, or to those in the
id consent from the
f government which
a president, is head,
rty of action, but in
head of all, it is yet

properly disciplined,
ed before consent is
oo readily accorded
stimulus of others
decision is a prevail-
subjective impulse

ie with two opposing
course of conduct;
le the balance re-
decision is the one
tence of one class
not in their favour;
but in this where
tence.

ible with reference
subjective state of

equilibrium; (2) that of non-consent, when the will is in opposition; and (3) that of consent, when the will is propitious.

It is evident, therefore, that no act of the will can ever take place till the subjective feeling of consent or resolution is aroused in the ego or subject. This is just the same as saying, in other words, that no subjective energy will either begin to act, or cease, except by a subjective resolution.

There are then just two stages or changes that occur in the will before an act is carried into effect:—(1) There is the resolution or consent to the act; (2) there is the subjective execution which carries the act into effect. The first, the resolution, or consent, is a subjective state or feeling, in reference to a certain conception; the second is a subjective act, carrying into effect the conception to which the resolution or consent has been yielded, which it does either by putting forth subjective energy or by withdrawing it. The subjective resolution or consent and the subjective execution (or energy put forth) might indeed be regarded as together constituting an act. The subjective resolution or consent originates the act, and the subjective execution (or energy put forth) accomplishes it; the former is the cause, the latter is the effect. The second, the subjective act, can never take place without the first, the subjective resolution or consent, in conjunction with it. The first, the subjective resolution or consent, may often occur without being attended by the subjective act; for we may consent or resolve to an act at the moment of doing it; or we may resolve only to do it at some future time.

Before explaining the difference between the case in which the subjective resolution is attended by the subjective act, and that in which it is not, it is necessary to observe that all subjective energy is so completely under the control of the subjective sense or feeling, that we have only to resolve that energy shall go forth, and it proceeds at once to work out our conception; or, if we resolve that it shall be withdrawn, it instantly returns to rest.

It works out the conception if it is a factor in the conception or object of resolution; if not, it remains inert. The manner in which the subjective energy responds to the subjective sense or resolution, is entirely spontaneous. We are conscious only of resolving that it shall go forth, and immediately we feel the movement, and the drain upon our subjective energies commences without any further interference on our part.

Each of us is endowed with this repository of energy or power; and the key to it is simply the subjective feeling of resolution or consent. "I resolve," is the simple sluice that opens the reservoir, shuts it, or makes it flow as we please. It is evident, then, that in every case in which subjective energy is an agent, it must be a factor in the conception whereunto we consent.

The difference, then, between the case in which we resolve or consent to do an act in future, and the case in which we conjoin the resolution and the act together, is this: in the first case, the consent does not actually include or cover the subjective energy, though it covers the promise of it.

The subjective energy itself is not a factor in the conception resolved on, although the promise of it is. The "I will" to the subjective energy has never been pronounced. It is simply a resolution that it shall be pronounced in the future.

In the second case, namely, that in which the subjective act and the subjective resolution are conjoined, the subjective energy, and not the mere promise of it, is at once a factor in the conception, and is covered by the resolution; so that the Ego or subject can say, "I resolve to put forth energy at this moment to do this act." The result is, that without further interference on his part, the subjective energies immediately come into operation.

It is also most noticeable here, that not only will the subjective energy neither begin to act nor cease except by a subjective resolution which covers it, but it will neither begin to act nor cease at any other moment than that in which the subjective resolution covers it. It commences work with a resolution, or it ceases work with a resolution; but mark, that it never commences to do either except just at the moment of resolution. For instance, if I resolve to put forth energy at this moment, it will respond to me at this moment; but if at this moment I resolve only that I shall put forth energy to-morrow, no energy will respond to me to-morrow, unless I shall resolve it again to-morrow at the very moment when I want it.

From this fact, taken in connection with the preceding ones, it follows that in the second case, namely, that in which the subjective resolution is conjoined with the subjective act, the ego or subject, in his subjective resolution, at once covers or includes the subjective energy in the conception which he wishes to carry into effect, knowing that it will immediately respond, which it certainly does.

In the first case, that in which a subjective resolution occurs without being attended by the subjective act, the ego, or subject, in fact, simply subjectively resolves at one moment that he will subjectively resolve again, at some future moment, to put forth energy to do