

2. *Nature of Soviet Acceptance*

General Burns said that Zorin had read out a formal statement of the Soviet position on the 8-power formula. He later emphasized that he was ready to "adopt the 8-power formula as a basis of further negotiations."

3. *U.S.-U.K. Reaction*

Godber for the U.K. said that he would like to be certain that the Soviet Union accepted his understanding namely, that the Soviet Union adopted the principles contained in the neutral formula, i.e. the establishment of an international control organization and some provision for the inspection of doubtful seismic events. Godber indicated that he found it hard to believe that the Soviet Union did accept these principles in the light of Khrushchev's latest message to Macmillan.¹⁸ If, however, they did accept them the U.K. agreed that this should be the basis of negotiation.

Dean for the U.S.A. said much the same but added that he wanted an assurance in writing of the Soviet Government's willingness to accept the principles as a basis of negotiation.

Zorin rejected indignantly Dean's proposal as insulting. He said that the establishment of such "preconditions" for further negotiation would be tantamount to asking the Soviet Union to accept in principle the position advanced by the other side for further negotiations. The statement he had made was the formal position of the Soviet Government, made on instructions.

After an acrimonious exchange the Bulgarian suggested that there should be a plenary meeting after lunch. Burns intervened with a counter proposal that the two co-chairmen meet privately to consider the basis of negotiation on the basis of the neutral formula, in order to avoid a propaganda debate in plenary. A third suggestion made by the Italian with the support of India proposed that the problem be turned over to the sub-committee of three (U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R.) on nuclear testing, and this was adopted. To this Mrs. Myrdal (Sweden) added that a plenary should be called later today to consider the results of the meeting of the sub-committee of three. As of the time of the telephone call, General Burns was awaiting word of the outcome of the sub-committee meeting and that Padilla Nervo the chairman of the day would name a time for the plenary.

4. *The Position of the Neutrals*

General Burns reported that the neutrals had decided with his encouragement that they were not going to prepare detailed replies to the technical questions posed by the U.S.A. and U.K. representatives at the plenary meeting of April 17, as they were not competent to do so. This kind of question would have to be discussed between the nuclear powers. Burns had been told by the Indian representative (Lall) that they approved the position which Canada had taken. He raised informally and tentatively the possibility that a last minute appeal might be made by Nehru, Diefenbaker and possibly Fanfani to Kennedy and Khrushchev.

5. *Possible Further Canadian Action*

General Burns said that the crux of the difficulty from the U.S. side was their confirmed opposition to any uncontrolled, unsupervised moratorium. Only if the Soviet Union unequivocally accepted the twin principles of international control and inspection of suspected events would the neutral basis of negotiation be accepted by the Americans. General Burns interpolated that Dean was bound by his instructions to seek no less and that in effect he was asking the Soviet Union to accept more than was in the 8-power proposal formula on these two

¹⁸ Voir/See D.C. Watt, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 62-70.