

1759. an Attempt was made to dislodge them by our Troops, and which brought on a brisk and obstinate Attack; but all our Efforts were to no Purpose, as it was absolutely necessary to bring up Cannon to drive them out.

The two Armies did not long remain in View of each other, without coming to Action; our Troops shewed a great Eagerness to engage, and Intrepidity, but kept it up a very little Time only; it was judged proper to take immediate Advantage of this Spirit; however, it had been more prudent to have waited the Arrival of Monsieur *De Bougainville*, who was advancing with the Flower of the Army; but our Generals thought they could do the Business without him, and so marched up to the Enemy. Our Troops gave the first Fire, and those

<sup>a</sup> It is most certain that the Army (*French*) formed in good Order, and that their Attack was very brisk and animated. *Townshend.*

<sup>b</sup> It was seemingly but ill judged of the *French* Generals to rush on to an Attack, without waiting for the Arrival of Monsr. *de Bougainville*, could they have prevented coming to Action, especially if what is here advanced be true, that he had the *Picked Men* or Flower of their Troops with him; add to this, his Situation was such, that, according to Mr. *Townshend*, the *English* Army must of Necessity have been put between two Fires. ("Scarce was this effected, when M. *de Bougainville* with his Corps from *Cape Rouge*, of 2000 Men, appeared in our Rear." *Townshend.*)

By General *WOLFE*'s Letter of the 5th of September, when this Landing was only in Agitation, and seemed to be intended as the Finishing Stroke of the Campaign, the *English* Army amounted to no more than 4 or 5000 effective Men; ("after the *Points of Levi* and *Orleans* were left in a proper State of Defence.") a very unequal Match for the *French* in Point of Numbers, even in any Situation, and much less so in the present one, and of which Brigadier *Townshend* seemed so very sensible, that when the Command devolved upon him by the much lamented Fall of General *WOLFE*, his first Employment, even after the Victory obtained, and the Rout of the Enemy, was to secure his Camp. ("I have been employed, from the Day of Action to that of the Capitulation, in redoubting our Camp beyond Insult." *Townshend.*)

'Tis probable, a Contempt of our Numbers, and a fancied Security of Success on that Account, might betray the Marquis *De Montcalm* into this rash Engagement, and which was very little consistent with his usual Coolness and Wisdom; for he seems in Mr. *WOLFE*'s own Opinion, (who certainly was no mean Judge) to have been an able and experienced Officer: ("The Obstacles we have met with, in the Operations of the Campaign, are much greater than we had Reason to expect, or could foresee; not so from the Number of the Enemy, (though superior to us) as from the natural Strength of the Country, which the Marquis *De Montcalm* seems wisely to depend upon." *WOLFE.*) He never could have been led into this Attack by any extraordinary Confidence