of the child was it hindrance. It he dawn of selfsee traces of the personal form of igment.

firms the account added fact that dgment is indicathild.

ess should also be asciousness in the of language, we lisappearing, first, and verbal tendarepresented by a tender the point where discursive judganimal conscious-

a distinction must cience of thought, atizes the various the laws by which It seeks to underitself.

the psychological nce of Language. understanding of

tience of Thought nust wait until the very great extent. It spun out of our the thought movewhich past thought may depend upon tal that he receives as an understanding of them from the psychological standpoint may demand. Just as the philologist, on the historical side, demands that he should be free from all interference from psychologists while investigating the facts and forms of language, so just as truly may the psychologist demand that the philologist should give simply the results of his labor as material and spare the advice which is so often given.

As there has been evolution in the physical and organic worlds, so there has been evolution in the conscious world. Of this the development of language is one of the most evident proofs. As civilization has advanced, language has been continually refined, until the efficient and graceful instrument which we find in more advanced nations in both past and present has been produced.

It may further be noticed that the earliest stage of language which the philologist can reach is still immeasurably far removed in time from primitive human speech. But although the barrier of time can never be overcome and we can never present the primitive language, still, from the nature of the development within language itself, we can form a quite trustworthy opinion of what its psychological nature must have been. This, however, is to presuppose the result of our analysis, to which we must now proceed.

In the unity of the discursive judgment (recognized by all and considered by most to be the only true form of judgment) two movements are usually distinguished—that of the subject and that of the predicate. These united in the copula represent the content of the unified thought. In these two movements certain distinctions are now made: nouns, adjectives from nouns, adverbs, etc. But while these various distinctions are recognized by philologists, it is emphasized that they were not always as clearly worked off as they now are. As we go backward in the history of language, the differences which distinguish the nominal and verbal movements begin to disappear. Not only do the differences in the inflectional forms disappear, but also the two movements themselves become confused. In certain cases nouns are derived from verbs and verbs from nouns. For this reason endeavors have been made to reduce nouns to verbs, and vice versa. But the general consensus of opinion now seems to

¹ Cf. Paul, Principles of Language; Brugmann, Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages, Morphology, Pt. I, p. 2; Max Müller, Science of Language and Science of Thought; Sayce, Introduction to the Science of Language; Delbrück, Introduction to the Study of Language; Giles, Comparative Philology.