

the whole list of questions, by means of mutual concessions; we do not have the authority to make or accept concessions; we are not a show gathering of envoys, and we do not have to go through the comedy of frauds and bargaining . . . .

"From our methods of work help may come in many ways, from which I am going to show but two: First, there may unexpectedly appear a successful formula or successful plan, which, as it sometimes happens, almost by magic eliminates all friction; -- though the Institute does not assume responsibility for this formula or plan, its mere existence is felt in responsible circles. Second, the discovery of certain points which the other side considers vital, or almost vital, important or relatively unimportant. So instead of saying at the conference: 'Will you give up this, or shall we give up that?' or 'we will do this for you if you will do that for us' we are saying: 'These are the advantages and these are the difficulties in the proposed plan. What advantages and what difficulties do you see?' When we exchange that kind of information we can return home to our countries with a better idea of the sphere of responsible discussions and decisions. By such a method we can accomplish much more than by assuming imaginary final decisions."

J. Merle Davis had the following impression from his conversations with Australian leaders during his organization trip in 1926:

"It is suspected that Americans have some plan, some conspiracy against the British Empire. Is the Institute trying to ruin the solidarity of the British Dominions, and attempting to build up under American hegemony a new organ of solidarity between English speaking people of the Pacific Ocean?"

"Others see in the Institute an attempt to divert the attention of the British Dominions from the League of Nations in favor of a competing organization on the Pacific Ocean. . . ."

#### Internal Policy of the Institute

The Japanese also had no great doubts as to the true purposes of the Institute, and if they decided to come into the Institute it was perhaps for the same reason as that of the League of Nations: They did not consider it expedient to be in opposition to the United States. However, the Japanese delegates did not refuse themselves the pleasure of presenting to American leaders of the Institute certain embarrassing questions.

As early as the first conference, the New Zealand delegate, J. B. Condliffe, Professor of Economics, who later came to hold an important position in the mechanism of the Institute, came out with a protest against the Institute's not inviting Great Britain.

Logically, with such a feeling on the part of New Zealanders and Australians, American leaders began to think, and then hurried to extend an invitation to Great Britain. Great Britain, however, was in no hurry to accept this invitation; she considered it wise to first carefully examine the complexion of this new American invention.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs decided to send a few persons, in the role of observers, to the second conference of the Institute.