forward claims to represent China. The struggles that is going on is within the Party. I am fairly sure the leaders who will emerge, be they Maoists or opponents of Mao, will emerge within the existing Party and government structure.

Mr. Andras: From the way you have described the situation and Mao's objectives which are to purge what he calls corruption, of becoming a "have" nation and the softness that would go with it, would it not be your opinion that this struggle is going to go on or repeat itself as long as Mao is alive? In other words, he is tackling an almost impossible situation which you, yourself, have said is impossible, changing the nature of man in China, and yet he is going to continue to try that as long as he is alive. So is this turmoil not going to continue as long as he is alive?

Mr. Taylor: It may or may not and we do not know the levels on which it will continue, if it does continue. If we go on past precedent, Mao has cut off campaigns after a certain amount of time. He is not one for unleashing endless political campaigns. On the other hand, this is a new level of intensity in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, so precedents are not entirely to be relied upon. There were signs, as I said, earlier this spring of a compromise situation evolving. I think this sort of thing will continue to happen. I do not think there will be a clear-cut end to the campaign. I do not think it will always go on on a steady level of rising intensification or the opposite. I think there will be periods of uncertainty where it will seem to get intense in some areas and relax in others.

Mr. Andras: Then it will be very hard to generalize, in that sense, if we accept the argument that this is a delicate time to recognize Red China. This might go on for years and years and years, using the same argument against recognition, because there will not necessarily be a clear-cut end to the issue there?

Mr. TAYLOR: No, but I would look at that the other way and say that while this struggle or debate, if you like, is going on, although it is primarily concerned with domestic issues, in my belief, it does have some foreign policy ramifications. What is being decided is the future course that China will take, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. Options are starting to open for the first time and they will become more open, in one way or another, after Mao passes from the scene, and I think, therefore, it is all the more important to show the Chinese that these options would get some response from the West.

Mr. Andras: In view of Mao's concern about the danger of contamination or corruption by western ideas, is there any real desire on the part of the Chinese leaders to have diplomatic recognition, which would mean at least the introduction of missions and a slight to large overflow of western ideas simply by their presence in China? Would they prefer, from that viewpoint, not to open the exchange of communications?

Mr. TAYLOR: A distinction has to be drawn here. They would very much welcome diplomatic recognition on terms that they can accept, such as the arrangement they made with France. They see this in terms of demolishing the American claim that China is isolated. The Chinese say that they are not isolated and that they have more than 40 countries with missions of one sort or another in Peking, and so on. They say they have friends everywhere. They use this sort