

What would be the consequences of making permanent the suspension of supplying nuclear co-operation to India? What would be the consequences on the safeguard system? Would the Indian government consider that the co-operation obligations of Canada had been breached, and that the safeguards - which are an integral part of the co-operation agreement - should be removed? To what extent should co-operation be resumed in order to permit an upgrading of existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor? Is the proposed agreement effective in ensuring that spent fuel from the RAPP reactor will never be used for explosions? To what extent does the proposed agreement represent new and significant safeguard obligations for India which would bear on the development of its nuclear policy? How would any upgraded system relate to this particular reactor about which we are concerned? How would such an upgraded system compare with Canadian and other suppliers' standards? Would our completing this single, particular program by which we might upgrade the safeguard system, lead to an over-all upgrading in the situation which other suppliers could accept and respect?

Other questions are: Would the completion of our particular project with India be an inhibiting or delaying factor regarding a further explosion in India? Would we have any effect or, indeed, would a second explosion be delayed or be out of bounds in India? These are some of the main questions that are now before me. They are questions which have been considered by the negotiators in India who have been acting under my instructions and have reached an understanding with their India counterparts.

I have not reached any conclusion on these understandings because there are further questions I want to ask and further refinements I want to achieve in respect of the interpretations of various terms that are being employed. But the simple test, really, is which is best for non-proliferation? Is it to get out, as the Honourable Member for Northumberland-Durham suggests, or to complete our particular single project and thereby achieve an upgrading of the safeguards system on an important nuclear reactor which, in the absence of the completion of our program, might be left unsafeguarded long into the future? That is the basic issue we face in so far as the India situation is concerned.

It has been a great disillusionment for Canada and the Canadian people that this unhappy and tragic explosion did take place in India. It certainly was against the understandings that we had reached and it had a serious effect upon all of us, I believe, in an attempt to reassess and reagonize over the dangers in respect of proliferation which exists in any transfer of nuclear technology, nuclear materials or nuclear equipment. We have reached the conclusion that even though there is a very difficult balancing to be made between the objective of sharing and the objective of non-proliferation, those two objectives can be pursued simultaneously and, as a responsible supplier, we probably, as a country, will do more to reach the objectives put forward this afternoon by participating energetically with principles rather than by withdrawing within a Canadian cloister.

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