

thereafter. At the October CSO meeting, Poland distributed a "non-paper" that looked at the details of how missions might be fielded, provided, trained, commanded and financed. In December, Canada produced a paper that examined conceptual issues, including the principles that might govern CSCE peacekeeping operations.²¹ Canada suggested that there must be threat to regional security; parties to a conflict must agree to work towards a political settlement; the operation must be accountable to a recognized political authority; the intervention by peacekeepers must have the consent of the parties to the conflict; the mission must have clear and workable mandate; and the mission must have sound financial basis. At the same time, Canada was exploring how NATO might provide visible support to strengthening the CSCE conflict prevention and management capabilities. It thought that NATO might offer a training program for observers/peacekeepers, with participants invited from all CSCE participating states or, more ambitiously, that NATO might coordinate planning for the provision of an eventual peacekeeping force for use under the CSCE mandate.

A "Friends of Peacekeeping" group, launched by Canada on the margins of the October CSO meeting in Prague, subsequently regrouped in Vienna and decided to adopt the Canadian paper as the drafting text for a proposed presentation to the Prague Council. The group included Austria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Sweden. Their paper on "CSCE Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines," which proposed including peacekeeping operations among the options available to the CSCE for preventing and resolving crisis, gained considerable support at a CSO meeting in Prague, January 8-10, 1992. The peacekeeping the "Friends" had in mind involved civilians as well as military personnel, would be without enforcement powers, and would be based on consensus and consent. Canada wanted the Prague Council conclusions to include at minimum a directive to the Helsinki FUM to consider possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping and, preferably, a ministerial endorsement of the paper on principles and guidelines.

The Prague Council

The Council meeting in Prague, held January 30-31, 1992, came at a time when the CSCE's credibility in conflict prevention and management was being challenged by the war in Yugoslavia. That experience severely dampened the enthusiasm for the CSCE that had surrounded the Paris Summit. The CSCE's powers seemed more declaratory than operational. Many were suggesting that the CSCE should "farm out" its mandate: security to NATO, economics to the EC, and the human dimension to the Council of Europe.

In Canada's view, the challenge was to establish reasonable credibility against reasonable expectations. The CSCE was still the only post-Cold War institution with a comprehensive mandate, a pan-European and transatlantic membership, and the political authority to demand adherence to commitments. The CSCE was not intended to be a collective defence alliance like NATO. Rather, it aimed at increasing participants' security by achieving consensus on principles and mechanisms designed to promote a responsible community of nations whose relations were based on cooperation rather than conflict. If that

²¹Included in Annex.