

"I turn now, Mr. Speaker, to what were to us more vital issues on which consultation took place at the NATO meeting. These related, of course, generally to the international situation confronting the alliance, particularly to the trends of Soviet policy and the attitude the Western countries could adopt toward the Soviet Union. Exchanges of views in this regard brought about remarkable unanimity of approach on these fundamental issues. We did at the outset agree that some of the recent actions of the U.S.S.R. have raised serious doubts as to the real intention of its leaders regarding a summit meeting. The members of that Ministerial meeting of NATO regretted that the Soviet Union had aggravated instead of reduced international tensions by its veto in the Security Council of the proposal put forward by the United States of America relating to the reducing of the risk of a surprise attack over the Arctic area. We also were bound to admit and acknowledge that proposals put forward by the Russians in recent weeks relating to the holding of a meeting, proposals not only of matters of substance but of matters of procedure, had made the preparations for a summit meeting more difficult.

"Nevertheless, despite the disappointments and doubts about the Soviet attitude, we resolved to continue our efforts to pave the way toward a summit meeting....

"It was recognized, however, that while summit meetings are desirable if they offer any reasonable prospect of reaching settlement on fundamental questions, they are not the only way or indeed they may not be the best way of conducting negotiations for the reduction of international tension. A summit meeting could be helpful if it were properly prepared and if it were to take place in a favourable atmosphere.

"At the meeting I suggested that the summit meeting, the one for which we have been working through the ambassadors of three members of NATO in Moscow in recent weeks, should be regarded as one of a series of meetings. I suggested, indeed, that it would not necessarily be the first. It could be regarded as the second meeting and we would think of the Geneva meeting in 1955 as the first in that series.

"I desire to impress the point upon the House, if I can, that this approach would recognize that it may not be possible -- indeed it will not be possible -- to settle at one meeting at the summit all the problems which separate the Soviet bloc from the NATO countries. Undoubtedly there has developed in the public opinion of the European members of NATO, and indeed one can sense it in Canada and the United States, a feeling that if we could have a summit meeting we could settle once and for all -- some of the suggestions go that far -- the problems that separate us from the U. S. S. R.

"If we follow the concept of a series of meetings then the next one, the second one as I like to call it, could consider a limited agenda with limited objectives. We could then honestly convey to the public in the various NATO nations that if a question which they naturally would have thought should have been on the agenda of that second meeting was not there it had been postponed to a later meeting. If we have limited objectives and reach a satisfactory reconciliation of the different views in respect of those matters, the smaller items, shall I say, then confidence and trust will be developed in some measure and on the basis of that confidence and trust a further meeting could be called to discuss even more serious questions. Because of the trust and confidence that would have been developed even to a partial degree there would be better prospects for agreement being reached at a subsequent meeting or meetings.

"The other day the Leader of the Opposition suggested, and I recognize that he did so tentatively, that the best kind of a meeting at this time might be an informal one between the heads of the United States and the Soviet Union for an exchange of views without an agenda. I am unable to share the optimism of the Leader of the Opposition in this regard. While a serious burden of responsibility falls upon the two most powerful nations in the world, nevertheless there are other interests involved on the Western side; and that was pointed out the other day in the House by the Prime Minister. Those interests should be adequately represented at a summit meeting. I have in mind that it would be probably unfair to place upon the United States the whole onus or responsibility for conducting negotiations at the summit and to be responsible for the failure of a summit meeting if that were the case.

"Also it does occur to me that it would be fruitful to have the heads of the two sides in question meet with an agenda before them. I am not being facetious when I say that I can well see Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower sitting down at a table without an agenda and saying, 'What will we discuss now in the field of international tension?' The field of international tension in that context means a global field, and that would call for preparation in order that the participants in such a meeting would be prepared to put forward concrete and considered suggestions. It is my view that such a meeting might not only prove useless but that its failure would increase international tensions rather than reduce them....

"Considerable emphasis was placed on the question of disarmament which would, of course, be one of the main items for discussion in any negotiations with the Soviet Government. The Ministers reaffirmed their view that the proposals of August 29, 1957, in the Disarmament Commission, the same proposals later being

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