

"Hearings on Executive H", before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, in 1968, connected with the military implications of the NPT, one finds the interpretation that Articles I and II do "not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory, as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling". Since we have no comparable access to similar publications in the Soviet Union, we do not know how the other super-Power views the situation with regard to a corresponding automatic suspension of its obligations under the Treaty.

The second operative article, which is the obverse, or the mirror-image of the first, spells out the obligations of the non-nuclear countries under the system of verification provided for in the following article.

Two of the nuclear Powers have unilaterally and voluntarily placed their peaceful facilities under the safeguards system of the IAEA. It is difficult to understand why the remaining nuclear Party has so far chosen not to do so, although such a decision is well within its rights according to the Treaty. Confidence in its provisions and purposes would be better served by an attitude of openness with regard to peaceful nuclear activities, the same ones which are subject to a close scrutiny when related to non-nuclear Parties.

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In the deliberations on the subject, verification has always been the central point in establishing the credibility of the test ban. I have no intention of quoting myself, but I recall that on a number of occasions I have discussed political, legal and technical aspects of verification as a very important element in disarmament arrangements. Verification is an instrument of effective deterrence against violation of disarmament agreements by providing timely and credible detection of such violations. Verification is also a means of confidence-building through which parties to an agreement can assure themselves that the agreement is in fact binding, and thus contribute to their national security.

I would like to emphasize that in the context of negotiations in this forum, we are looking at multilateral verification institutions and capabilities. There is a number of factors that need to be considered in this context. The capabilities of such a multilateral system are determined by who the participants are, as well as what they would contribute to this system. Its effectiveness will be governed by the institutional arrangements to collect data, process them, make an appropriate analysis and take necessary actions. With regard to underground nuclear explosions, there are different opinions about the detection capabilities. The difference comes from what assumptions one makes. If one is talking about known test sites with the emplacement of numerous so-called "black boxes" around them, the detection capabilities will be very high, whereas if one is talking about underground nuclear explosions that might take place in any part of the world, including possible tests under the sea-bed, there is much to be desired before meaningful capabilities can be achieved.

The Working Paper CD/524 which I am introducing today describes a very simple and practical idea, which my Foreign Minister called the next-best, but a very practical approach. We shall start with the prohibition of nuclear testing within the existing multilateral verification capabilities. In other words, rather than waiting for the perfection of technology as well as considerable expenditure to complete a world-wide ideal network, we may start with what we have already got. In this regard, my delegation hopes to see an ad hoc Committee established under a mandate such as the one con-