Confidence-Building Measures from attempts to understand the dynamics and causes of Soviet military policy, particularly when that policy and the capabilities that it animates can be seen to be dangerously offensive, is intellectually irresponsible and practically very unwise.

The second fundamental type of generic flaw in Confidence-Building thinking addressed a very different sort of problem: *the widespread and pronounced failure to either provide or refer to a satisfactory or even plausible model of the CBM process.* Most of the Confidence-Building literature makes some sort of reference to the ways in which "confidence" can be created or fostered but, as we noted, *there is seldom any serious discussion of the dynamic psychological process or processes that would presumably "make" the CBMs work.* Related to this is the fact that the CBM literature makes reference to many categories or types of Confidence-Building Measures, each of which may rely upon a different conception of Confidence-Building process or mechanism.

For all the Confidence-Building literature's interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful CBMs, this study concluded that there was remarkably little analytic interest in exploring how ordinary individuals and groups were affected positively by the particular goals or mechanisms of those Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, it simply isn't good enough to assume, as a sizeable proportion of the CBM literature seems to, that knowing "all about" an adversary's forces and policies will "somehow" reduce or control "unwarranted" suspicion. There is no reference to *how or why* this will transpire. There is merely the intuitive assumption that knowing more about a potential adversary will reduce misperception and groundless mistrust. However plausible this may seem at first glance, there is no explanation of what the Confidence-Building dynamics are and how they work. This type of thinking ignores a great deal of research on the operation of perception, information processing and decision-making, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence-Building pro-

cess. The failure to employ psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand these dynamics was regarded as a crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.

In addition to these psychologically-oriented problems associated directly with explaining how Confidence-Building Measures work, we noted that there was virtually no consideration of the complex processes that animate the whole problem of misperception, suspicion, faulty inferences and, more generally, the inability to see and understand complex phenomena in an objective manner. Most CBM analyses *begin with the proposition that the misperception and the mistrust and the lack of confidence already exist and that "something" ought to be done about it.* The origins and the mechanisms of misperception and the broader array of cognitive processes that structure the basic problems in the first place are frequently ignored. *If Confidence-Building Measures to counter these mechanisms and processes are to be constructed and negotiated successfully, surely the mechanisms and processes themselves must be understood first.*

In the process of exploring these problems, we also developed the outline of an argument suggesting that Confidence-Building may have certain features in common with decision-making. On the basis of insights derived from contemporary decision-making theory, we suggested that, like decision making, the Confidence-Building process may combine distinctive elements of the rational and the non-rational or cognitive. When it is reduced to its most elementary form, for instance, Confidence-Building appears to entail a *rational* intention and method aimed at penetrating and correcting the destabilizing and corrosive effects of misperception and misunderstanding. However, misperception (viewed generally as a collection of faulty understandings) is a fundamentally non-rational phenomenon. Also like decision-making, Confidence-Building itself may very well be a far less "rational" enterprise than either theorists or policy makers suspect, largely because of the major role played by var-