

Dr. MacGuigan summed up the Canadian Government's view of UNSSOD II: "it should be a mistake to dwell too long on what was not achieved at UNSSOD II or to succumb to the temptation of sustained hand-wringing about failure. Rather, we should be grateful that it was held in spite of an exceedingly unpropitious international atmosphere.

"We should also welcome the fact that UNSSOD II preserved intact the viability of the United Nations system to deliberate constructively on international security matters, particularly arms control and disarmament. Despite the temptation to vote resolutions which could not achieve consensus, the non-aligned countries in the end chose the path of realism rather than a procedure which could only devalue the system.

"An important achievement of UNSSOD II was its reaffirmation of the Final Document of UNSSOD I. The Program of Action in that Final Document highlighted the importance of the negotiating process, as did the many world leaders who addressed the Special Session."

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### **UNSSOD II and Canada: The Prime Minister's Address**

The importance which Canada attaches to arms control and disarmament was symbolized by the attendance of the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau, at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. In his June 18 address to the plenary, he concentrated on nuclear issues, a focal point of public concern today. Following are excerpts from his address:

"Instability is the fuel that feeds the nuclear arms race. That is why, four years ago, I put before this Assembly a 'strategy of suffocation' designed to deprive the nuclear arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds, from the laboratories to the testing sites.

"The main elements of the strategy had long been familiar features of the arms-control dialogue: a comprehensive test ban; a halt to the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and a limitation, and eventual reduction, of military spending for new strategic weapons systems. It was in the combination of these elements that I saw a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising instrument for curbing the nuclear arms race.

"But the strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally. It always envisaged negotiated agreements between the nuclear powers. All elements of the strategy would probably not fall into place at once. But all were essential if the strategy were to have its full effect: the halt of the technological momentum of the arms race by freezing at the initial or testing stage the development of new weapons systems.

"While I continue to believe that such a technological freeze is fundamental to controlling the arms race, I would now propose, however, that it be enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization. I do not consider the strategy of suffocation to be in competition with current negotiations or with negotiations shortly to commence. Indeed, I believe that the more successful these negotiations are, the more likely will they need to be entrenched in agreements along the lines I have proposed.

"The impact of the current and proposed negotiations, if they succeed, will be to produce a stable balance at a much lower level of armament. It will involve not only important quantitative reductions, but a qualitative change, in that destabilizing systems will have been reduced. We will be dealing not only with a balance at lower levels but with a different kind of balance, in that it will be more stable.

"Thus a policy of stabilization has two complementary components: the suffocation strategy which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our current negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

"Before I leave the subject of suffocation, I must underscore the urgency of coming to grips with the development of new weaponry for use in outer space. Twenty-five years ago, the first man-made satellite was launched. That event marked a leap in man's mastery of the earth's environment. Fifteen years ago, it did not seem premature to close off the possibility that space might be used for other than peaceful purposes. But today, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is patently inadequate. That is how quickly, in today's world, science fiction becomes reality.

"The treaty lays down that nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are not to be placed in orbit, around the earth or stationed in space. In retrospect, that

leaves loopholes which risk being highly destabilizing. I am thinking particularly of anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems. I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.

"Of course, the whole edifice rests on key assumptions about verification, and it is to the theory and practice of verification that we must increasingly give attention.

"Openness is central to the process of verification. But here, too, technology has taken us well beyond the notions about openness that were prevalent only 25 years ago. When we speak of verification by 'national technical means', we have in mind the vast range of activity that is detectable by the magic eye of highly sophisticated satellites plying their intrusive orbits around the globe. I sometimes wonder whether we realize the immensity of the leap we have made; and whether a certain reluctance in accepting the rigours of verification is not an insufferable anachronism.

"Verification is not only a matter of access. Verification entails a technology of its own that differs, from weapons system to weapons system. Therefore, ideally, the work on verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead; otherwise, problems of verification will inevitably prevent the conclusion of even well advanced arms control negotiations. In this context I am encouraged by the positive approach to verification procedures contained in the remarks of the Soviet foreign minister earlier this week.

"However, given the complexity and characteristics of many modern weapons systems, so-called national technical means may not be adequate for verifying arms control or disarmament agreements. Consequently, the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s.

"In Canada we are allocating increased funds for arms control and disarmament initiatives. This decision will allow us to take two important steps. First, we are committing resources to enable Canada to become a full participant in the international seismic data exchange, the international verification mechanism which will form part of the provisions of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We believe that the exchange should be