

the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement. One point which had not been made in his previous reports was that it would be advantageous to have UNEF on both sides of the armistice line.

Most of the speakers on the first day of debate were, in varying degrees, critical of Israel. Mr. Eban, however, made a lengthy statement of the Israeli point of view, and Mr. Lodge expressed briefly the United States' general concurrence with the Secretary-General's recommendations. On the next day Mr. Pearson explained the Canadian view that, while withdrawal of Israeli forces was required, the Assembly should not confine itself to that one issue. He commented, too, on the Secretary-General's report.

I should like to say a few brief words on the problem that we have been discussing and, at the same time, to reserve my right to speak again when, perhaps, we shall have some draft resolutions—or at least one draft resolution—before us which deals with this subject.

The problem with which we have been dealing is coming to a head with consequences of vital importance to us all, and perhaps even to peace. As I see it, it is a problem not only of the completion of the withdrawal of Israel forces—although that is first in order of priority—it is a problem not only of making arrangements for security in the unsettled border areas concerned or for free navigation, but of making, I hope, such arrangements here which will be agreed on in this Assembly, but which will take effect only after Israel has accepted the decision of the United Nations to withdraw.

If we take the position that the United Nations cannot even consider these related questions, these questions of arrangements along the lines that I have just indicated, if we cannot even consider those questions until after withdrawal has been completed, if we cannot even take a decision on them at, or immediately after, the time when we have taken a decision here on withdrawal—even if that decision is not to be implemented until after withdrawal itself—then I believe that certain delegations will have great difficulty in accepting that position in regard to the relationship, or the non-relationship, between these two problems.

If, on the other hand, Israel does not agree to complete and immediate withdrawal and to a proposal for a reasonable resolution of the related problems which would be acceptable to this Assembly, then also there will be no peaceful settlement of these problems, and Israel will be in the position of having taken the responsibility for rejecting decisions of the United Nations and remaining where it is, without any international support and, indeed, in the face of an international decision.

I suggest that we must do our best to avoid both these negative results by rejecting both these extreme positions; and I believe that we should take this—if I may call it that—middle position, not in the interests of any one State, and certainly not to reward or approve any action by any State which we have already condemned, but in the interests of peace and security. Certainly, Israel has no right to attach conditions to withdrawal of its forces. But, as delegations to the United Nations General Assembly, we have, I think, the right and, indeed, even the duty, to relate these two matters: withdrawal and proposals which may make impossible the kind of situation in the future which we have been facing during the last two or three months. And I believe that, as delegations, we have the right—at least my delegation is of this opinion—to say that our attitude towards one problem must be influenced by the attitude of the General Assembly towards the other problem. Failure to agree on a middle course of this type means possible—indeed means probable—failure to agree on any course; and that would mean deadlock and a return not only to the unhappy conditions of yesterday, but also to conditions that might be even worse and even more dangerous to international peace and security. It would mean also a demonstration of futility on the part of this Organization which might have far-reaching effect. And I know that we all agree that it is our responsibility to do what we can to avoid this disastrous result, which, surely, no one wants.

In our view the Secretary-General's report (A/3512), which we have before us and which we have been considering, shows the way out of this deadlock. The Secretary-General has given his views—sane and reasonable views—on the steps which should be taken after withdrawal, but which perhaps we can approve now. Those steps must