

was stormed. I do not note all the changes rung upon this theme; but they are numerous.

Unhappily, the fact is falsely stated, without offence to the Prussians Spickeren was not taken. Since the testimony of a Frenchman might seem interested, I will here cite certain lines which the Germans will not dream of denying, without doubt. They are extracts from the Prussian official despatches:

"The combat only finished with complete darkness. The enemy covered their retreat with a violent cannonade from the heights of Spickeren."

Duke William of Wurtemberg, commandant of the Prussian guard, is even more explicit: "I wish to contradict beforehand an opinion widely spread, that the position of the French near Saarbruck was captured by a bold charge with the bayonet. All that one can say is that, of numerous attacks delivered by the Prussians with extraordinary bravery, a single one succeeded, and even that success was due to the turning movement early prepared." Spickeren was not abandoned by the brave division of Larau coupet till near 9 o'clock at night and the battle was over. Besides, in spite of their victory, the Prussians did not take a step in advance, and did not even dare enter into Forbach. By every impartial judge this attack of the 6th August will be criticised as a gross fault, which might have compromised by an important check the success of the whole campaign. What proves almost to demonstration that it was not prepared, is the precipitate, the furious haste of the brigades on the road to Saarbruck. Does it accord well with Prussian habits to rush thus on an enemy one against two, and to leave to chance the task of directing regiments and divisions? At Woerth the Prince Royal had 140,000 men against the 35,000 of MacMahon. It is evident that this attack was prepared; but at Forbach it was nothing but a full butt—buffalo-like—the heroic folly of an impatient general. Frederick Charles was two or three days' journey distant; Kamecke wished to snatch from him the glory of beating the French. Let those who, seduced by the result, still doubt, run over the files of the *Times*; they will find the following lines:

"It is not improbable that the movement of the First German division, was premature, but the dispositions of the German generals once the battle was fairly engaged, were able."

The German works are no less explicit. We copy their phrases: "He (General Frossard) was attacked sooner than was intended by the general staff." "But the advanced guards, too impatient, engaged the Fourteenth Prussian division, under General Kamecke, in a combat which soon assumed a serious character, so that it became necessary to send him help."

The day was over—the 6th August; the Prussians were victors. What did they do? Pursue us? But they did not even dare leave the wood of Forbach and enter the town. They could not even throw a regiment or squadron after us. More still, the next morning they allowed a French division (Castigny's) to occupy the town for twenty-four hours. But let us suppose now that General Kamecke was induced to moderate his bellicose ardor. The 6th August was passed in quiet; equally so on the 7th. On the morning of the 8th the cannon thundered against Sarreguimines—it was Prince Frederick Charles entering the lines with 120,000 men. Our two divisions, scattered all the way from Sarreguimines to Bitsche, were cut to pieces; the Second corps cut off

if it had not abandoned Forbach, all retreat forbidden to it; and the Prince passing through our scattered brigades, would have annihilated one after the other those regiments, held as if in a vice between the troops of the Crown Prince of Saxony, those of Steinmetz, and his own.

The left wing entered in line at Woerth by a thunderbolt, destroying an army; the centre and right—more than 200,000 men—played a rôle none the less grand; and all those fine French regiments, too much scattered to be able to maintain themselves, were devoted to assured defeat. Metz was unarmed. Who knew if the campaign might not terminate itself in one day? But the attack at Forbach came to destroy these projects, and perhaps this defeat did—alas! for a very little time!—save the army. To triumph over our soldiers it needed yet Bory, Gravelotte, St. Privat—more yet, it needed Bazaine.

This was not all: Our divisions were instructed by danger; they concentrated. In two days, by the 8th, the 9th, at the latest, they will be reunited at Metz. Instead of waiting for Prince Frederick Charles, they will rejoin with all haste MacMahon and the remnant of his army, and then the defiles of Argonne will become, as in 1792, the Thermopylæ of France.

The plan is simple, evident. The Prussians themselves indicated it to us by their premature attack. We had four days' start, and whatever haste the Crown Prince used he could not have reached us. These are the logical consequences which ought to have followed the attack of the 6th; but chance, fatality, madness—for, in truth, it is impossible to call it simply incapacity—our soldiers call it treason—came in to serve the Prussians.

Instead of profiting by the few days we had before us, and frankly adopting an energetic resolution, our chiefs went promenading their soldiers from Metz to St. Avold, from St. Avold to Faulquemont, to gather them once more at Metz. Then, on the 14th, when it was too late, when Prince Frederick Charles was able to meet us, we tried to pass. These hourly indecisions, these weaknesses, these nullities, repaired the fault of Kamecke. All was against us—numbers, science, arms, fortune—and that not yet sufficing to destroy us—our generals.

ANCHOR.

THE CANADIAN ARMY—ABROAD.

The report of the Dominion Minister of Militia for 1871 has been issued. Among the most prominent measures introduced by the department during the past year is that of the inauguration of a uniform and systematic mode of carrying out the annual drill of the active militia in camps of exercise, more in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare; the great majority of the troops assembled at these camps being concentrated with rapidity, paid and supplied as if in actual service, and placed in command of officers appointed for that purpose. Two schools of artillery are to be established at once, one at Kingston and one at Quebec, under the command of specially trained officers of the Royal Artillery. These schools are to act as batteries, and serve in the guarding of posts, barricades, arsenals, and military stores in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, in addition to affording means for the complete training of such officers and men in artillery exercises as are attached thereto. The report states that two military districts have been established in Manitoba and British Columbia, that the system is

extended throughout the whole of British America. The nominal strength of the militia of the Dominion at the close of December, 1871, was 43,174 men, of whom 34,414 officers and men performed the annual drill. In the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia there are nearly 700,000 men liable by law to military service, being an increase of 35,000 over the preceding year. The report shows the Canadian militia system and the militia department to be in a state of admirable efficiency.

It is unfortunate that the United States Government should not also make some effort toward reorganizing the militia of the different States on a uniform basis. Such a measure has frequently been urged upon Congress, and another session ought not to pass without its passage. With the Regular Army so reduced in size, the General Government is compelled in case of war to fall back almost entirely upon its citizens for aid; and, let us ask, does not the experience of our late war amply illustrate the necessity of having these citizens trained previously in the art of war? By a thoroughly organized national militia the United States may obviate the popular objections to a large standing army, and yet feel perfectly assured in case of a war. The theory of placing the organization of the militia entirely under State control has long since proved fallacious, as not one State in ten has made efforts to organize, let alone properly sustain, a volunteer militia in proportion to its population. We trust that Congress will see the necessity of taking some steps toward organizing and sustaining a United States militia worthy of the republic.—*Army and Navy Journal*.

MOBILITY OF FIELD ARTILLERY.—A suggestion for increasing the mobility of the Royal Artillery has been made by Lieut-Colonel G. Carleton, R. A., and submitted to the Royal Artillery Institution. He takes it for granted that the field pieces of the future will have its gunners carried into action with their guns, instead of mounting them as at present, on the ammunition waggons, and that neither the waggons nor the limbers will be packed as they now are with knapsacks, camp kettles &c. He directs attention to the form of the ammunition waggons which should be as light as the guns for perfect efficiency. He therefore proposes the abolition of the present composite fourwheel carriages, drawn by six horses, and the substitution of two wheel carts drawn by one horse, or two at the most. The advantages which he claims for his system are the greater ease with which a pair of horses can be managed by one driver, than a team of six by three drivers, the ease with which the two wheeled carriage can be moved over bad or confined ground, the safety and rapidity with which exhausted timbers could be relieved in action, and the economy in men and horses, and wear and tear of horses and harness and carriages incident to the ordinary manoeuvring at regimental parades of waggons along with their guns. Colonel Carleton suggests that nothing can be more cumbersome or less scientifically arranged for draught than the present ammunition waggons, limbered only as they are, and intimates that their only advantage—their capability of moving off a gun when the gun limber becomes disabled—may be met by adapting the proposed carts to that purpose. He asks that the plan may at least have a trial.—*Volunteer News*.