

narrator of the Waterloo campaign says, that when Wellington retired from Quatre Bras upon Waterloo, his troops moved in the open fields on each side, leaving the road for the artillery and trains. But before the French, following him, passed Gonnappe, a violent rain had rendered the fields impassable; consequently, their troops were restricted to the road, and the column was lengthened, entailing these consequences: that Wellington's compact march was beyond reach of pressure from the enemy, and that, while his troops filed into their destined positions in the line, the rearmost French divisions did not reach the field till long after dark.

No better illustration of this part of the subject can be found than in the orders for the movement of the French army upon Casale in 1859, when about to cross the Po. They ran thus:

"As the army is about to operate in a country cut up with canals and rivers, the troops on the march will be nearly always in column on the causeways, and the heads alone will be at once ready for action. It is essential, then, that one division, for example, should be so organized as to be ready to enter into line as soon as possible. To this end a division of four regiments, one battalion of chasseurs, two battalions, and two squadrons, shall be thus divided into four moveable columns—

- "1. A portion of cavalry to clear the way.
 - "2. Twenty sappers and pioneers with pickaxes to destroy obstacles, and throw small bridges of felled trees over canals.
 - "3. Two guns without waggons.
 - "4. A company of chasseurs to protect and flank the guns.
 - "5. A regiment of infantry.
- "The rest of the battery; and so for the remainder.

"In spite of the inconvenience of prolonging columns, a great distance will be left between them to avoid confusion.

"When a road is parallel to the railway, the infantry will march on the railway, guns on the road.

"On arriving at crossings, horsemen will be sent on all the roads to preserve communication with columns that move parallel, and to look out for the enemy.

"Whenever a halt is made, and the fields at the side of the road are practicable for infantry or guns, the troops will form up on as wide a front as possible, to diminish for a moment the depth of the column.

"It need not be said that generals will take all the lateral roads which conduct to the same end, provided their columns will not thereby be too much separated.

"Should a column be attacked, the trains will be "parked" at once, to leave the road free for troops."

(To "park" trains is to form them in compact order in fields or open spaces adjoining the roads.)

It would be a mistake to suppose that the preceding matter of this chapter depends for its truth on the condition that it must be applied only to regions where railways do not exist. The districts, even in Europe, are few where existing railways would leave great armies in any considerable degree independent of the ordinary roads; and, in fact, the very orders just quoted were given in a theatre of war traversed by railways. But whether the communications of this kind be few or many, one fact alone suffices to prove the point, which is, that an army advancing or intending to advance, can never trust to railways which are within the sphere of the enemy's operations, even to the most extended line of his outposts, since a few men can, in a very short time, render

a railway temporarily unserviceable. There will always, therefore, be a considerable space between the fronts of the armies where only the ordinary roads can be relied on for manœuvring; and it is only in an inconsiderable degree, and for partial movements, that railways can be resorted to, when opposing forces are so near that collision becomes imminent. Thus Louis Napoleon, in the transfer of his army from the north bank of the Po in 1859, for the advance by Novara to the Ticino, only moved one corps (Cannobert's) by rail. In the action at Gasteccio, Forey's troops, engaged with the enemy, were reinforced by means of the railway; but that railway lay directly in rear, and Forey was fighting a defensive action. Again, in the battle of Bull Run, the defeat of the Northern army was mainly accomplished by the attack of a brigade brought on the field by the Manassas railway from the Shenandoah Valley. But none of these operations were of sufficient magnitude to render it necessary to treat as peculiar the case of armies manœuvring in a theatre intersected by railways, which need be regarded only as roads giving greatly increased facilities for movement, at the same time that they afford an extremely precarious reliance when within reach of the enemy's enterprises.

(To be continued.)

The following description of the various fortified positions on the old lines of the Meuse and Moselle will be interesting to our readers, especially as it is historical ground, and now likely to be the scene of greater events than any hitherto decided on its hard fought fields:—

"On the Rhine, Wesel is on the right bank just below the mouth of the Lippe, and commands both rivers. At Dusseldorf a considerable body of troops is stationed; it has ample railway communication with all points. Cologne, a great railway centre, is strongly fortified with isolated forts, although modern ordnance with its long range could reduce them. A large army could speedily be assembled here, and this would be necessary as its possession would give an invading army a secure base of operations. Between Aix la Chapelle and Cologne two small rivers flow to the northward, the Erft emptying into the Rhine and the Roer emptying into the Meuse. The first cannot seriously impede an army, but the latter offers special facilities for defence. From Lage a railway and good road pass through Aix la Chapelle to Cologne. In France, Verdun, Montmedy and Longwy are all strongly fortified, but Metz is the most important French strategic point in this direction, and the waters of the Moselle can be artificially raised so as to flood the low grounds and afford additional protection to the south and south-west sides of the town. From Metz rail and carriage roads lead down the left bank of the river to Thionville, crossing the Orne by separate bridges. Thionville is enclosed by regularly laid out works, but is of no great value if held without Metz, which together, however, would form a strong base of operations. The Moselle, running in almost the direct line between Berlin and Paris, would be the shortest line of operations between France and Prussia. For guarding the frontier and defending the Rhine, as well as for covering an invasion of France, no better position could be found than Luxembourg. It is of immense natural strength and easily defensible. The only well advanced Prussian fortress for the defence of the Rhine is Saarlouis, a small

work on the Saar, a tributary of the Moselle. The strongest defensive point on the Rhine is Ehrenheitstein, opposite Coblenz and the mouth of the Moselle. It is, however, dominated by higher hills, and has been several times taken. Coblenz is surrounded by a strong wall, and defended by two strong forts—Alexander and Constantine—the first being the strongest in this vicinity next to Ehrenheitstein. That once captured the city would no longer be tenable. Fort Frantz on the left bank of the Moselle commands the railway along the Rhine and the carriage road to Cologne and Treves. This strong position could be turned by crossing the Rhine at Neuwied, and advancing directly northward, but it would be a perilous operation, as communication could not be kept open. Mayence with Castel just across the Rhine forms a very important station for the defence of the river. It is well defended and new works are now in process of erection.

"At Manheim the fortifications were destroyed in 1799, and have never been rebuilt. It is a place of considerable strategic importance, and would make a favourable crossing point for turning the position at Mayence. Landau occupies an advantageous position, but has been repeatedly taken. It was regained by Germany in 1814. From Heilberg to Neustadt the plains on either side of the Rhine have been the scene of repeated struggles, and have been marked by great barbarities. On the Queich, not navigable for steamers, are two fortresses, Landau and Germersheim. The Island Elisabethworth is also fortified, and large sums have been expended on these works.

"At Weissenburg, the French frontier descends to the plain of Alsace following the river Lauter to the Rhine, which France has for her Eastern boundary from the Lauterburg to Basle. A chain of works running for nearly fifteen miles, was abandoned in 1869, although not destroyed. The practicable passes through the Vosges mountains, running parallel with the Rhine and forming a second barrier to the French frontier have all been strongly fortified. The fortress of Bitsch, commanding the Northern road has on several occasions resisted the attacks of the Prussians successfully. The great central passage is by way of Laverne defended by the fort at Pfalzburg, supported by Strasburg, Pelfort and two fortresses in the plain sufficiently guard the only two practicable passes between Laverne and Belfort. The fort of Belfort stands in the middle of the opening between the Jura and the Vosges, on the direct road between Basle and Paris. On the eastern side of the Valley of the Rhine, on German soil, the most important stronghold is Rastadt, on the Murg. It lies four miles back from the Rhine, and is strongly fortified. The only German defensive work in the Rhine Valley, south of Rastadt, is the fortified bridge over the Rhine at Kehl."

THE MONTREAL FIELD BATTERY AT TROUT RIVER.

PRESENTATION TO MR. W. ARTHUR.

Amongst the various excursions from the City on Dominion Day, there was none of a more pleasing nature than that of a portion of Colonel Stevenson's Field Battery to Trout River, the object in view being a presentation to Mr. W. Arthur, Trout River. At 7 o'clock in the morning the number detailed for that duty mustered at the Bombardment Depot awaiting the departure of the train at that hour, but unfortunately circumstances prevented the party from leaving before the 9 o'clock express, which,