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family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action. . . . The mere present sense of collective pleasure or pain is enough to organize the complex feeling. The good of the individual must begin to yield to the good of the community."

The state of consciousness called pleasure according to the Spencerian view accompanies those activities which tend to the perfection of the organism, while pain, indicating discord between inner and outer relations, impairs the powers of the organism and is opposed to fulness and perfection of life. In pursuing pleasurable courses of life, organisms have lived in a way conducive to completeness of life. Excesses and cases of moral disease, as Fiske observes, do not invalidate the corollary which inevitably follows from the doctrine of evolution that pleasures are the incentives to life-supporting acts and pains the deterrents from life destroying acts.

Darwin, who recognizes conscience or the moral sense as the most important distinction between man and the lower animals, nevertheless finds the basis of the moral sense in the feeling of dissatisfaction at lawing sacrificed the ever-enduring social instinct to the temporary with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well-developed, as in man."

Old impressions are continually repassing through the mind. The weaker impressions of past hunger, of satisfied vengeance, of peril escaped by injuring others, etc., man is compelled to compare with the ever enduring instinct of sympathy, companionship and good will which is still present and always active. He will then feel in his imagination that a stronger instinct has yielded to one which now seems comparatively weak, and that sense of dissatisfaction will inevitably be felt with which. man is endowed, like every other animal, in order that his instincts may be obeyed." It is in this feeling of dissatisfaction and in the accompanying desire to do differently in the future, that Darwin sees the explanation of regret and remorse, and the basis of conscience and "the imperious word ought," which imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, serving man as a guide, though liable often to be disobeyed. The dissatisfaction which comes from disobedience, if weak causes regret; if severe, remorse, and these feelings develop the moral sense which grows with the expansion of sympathy, as communities come together and afford the conditions of a larger social life.

The earlier English writers on ethics were not influenced in their speculations by contemporaneous foreign thought, but Bentham derived several of the doctrines which form the ground-plan of his work from the French writer Helvetius; and Comte's influence is seen in the moral and political speculations of John Stuart Mill and other writers of the last fifty years. During this time, and longer, Kant and other German writers on ethics have profoundly influenced the intuitional school of