

insist as he may on the fact that concrete objects are not apprehended by sense alone, he yet grants that something is apprehended or received passively into the mind. An abstract and a pure conception, as he thinks, agree in so far as both reduce knowledge to unity by the combination of differences. In reality, however, abstraction is not a process of combination, but a process of separation; and individual concretes are not by such a process raised to a higher unity, but on the contrary divested of the unity which at first they possessed. On the other hand, the categories really combine the particulars of sense, or rather, as Kant would say, make that combination possible; and the unity so produced is the real unity of concrete objects and specific connections of objects.

(3.) The attempted assimilation of mere fictions of abstraction with real conceptions leads to an imperfection in Kant's way of looking at the categories themselves. A category is a universal or form of thought, which is potentially a synthesis of the manifold of sense. It is, in fact, as treated by Kant, virtually a function of synthesis. But as the forms of the mind stand in stiff and abrupt contrast to the manifold, the categories are held to belong to the constitution of the intellect, while the particulars of sense are supplied to the mind in an external way. Accordingly, as before the forms of perception were held to belong only to us as men, so now the forms of thought are regarded as preventing us from getting beyond the limits of experience. It is true that the categories might apply to a manifold different from that actually given to us; but this possibility of extending our knowledge beyond experience is of no avail, since no other than a sensuous manifold can be apprehended by us.