same, and it is so because we in this Senate, as they in the Senate of the United States, are the guardians of special interests.

On referring to the Debates at the time of Confederation, to which the memorandum refers, it will be found that it was the intention of the Fathers of Confederation that this honourable House should be independent of the House of Commons. During the debates their attention was drawn to the fact that they were making away with the swamping power, and that therefore this branch of Parliament would be independent of the House of Commons; and it appears from the discussion that that was understood at the time the Act was passed. The honourable gentleman (Hon. W. B. Ross), in his memorandum, specially refers to remarks made by Sir John Macdonald, who was acting as Premier and Attorney General, and who amongst other things said:

> The fact of the Government being prevented from exceeding a certain number will preserve the independence of the Upper House.

That had reference, I think, to clause 26 of the Act, which provides for the appointment of six additional members. He also said:

> To the Upper House is to be confided the protection of sectional interests: therefore it is that the three great divisions are there equally represented for the purpose of defending such interests against majorities in the Assembly.

Then Mr. George Brown said:

> But honourable gentlemen must see that the limitation of the members in the Upper House lies at the base of the whole compact on which this scheme rests.

Mr. Dorion took the same view. He pointed out that the effect of abolishing the swamping power was to make the Senate entirely independent.

So we have, on one hand, an Act which is perfectly plain in its terms, confiding the power to both the Senate and the House of Commons, without any distinction, without any preference one over the other, except sections 53 and 54; and, on the other hand, the important fact that it was intended to make the Senate independent of the House of Commons, because the Senate was entrusted with the protection of the interests of the provinces.

I think it is our duty to realise what are our powers, but not with a view of abusing them or exercising them unduly. I think this House should be commended for the way in which it has exercised its powers in the past, especially in money matters. It has acted very discreetly and should continue to act discreetly. On the other hand, if we have power to deal with money matters—and I claim that unquestionably we have—and if occasion should arise when that power should be exercised for the protection of the provinces and for the purpose of preserving equality between the provinces, I think it is our duty not to shirk from exercising it, and exercising it freely. Section 53 of the British North America Act says:

> Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue, or for imposing any tax or impost, shall originate in the House of Commons.

That unquestionably curtails the powers of this House, but it curtails them only to the extent stated. Because a Bill of that kind must originate in the House of Commons is no reason why we should be deprived of the right of dealing with it freely, provided that the amount authorized by the Crown is not exceeded. I think that our position in that respect is on a par with that of the House of Commons. Private members of the House of Commons are not allowed to present a money Bill. It must originate with the Cabinet, because it must be accompanied by a message from the Crown. But the moment the message has been received and the Bill has been introduced by the Government, the members of the House of Commons deal with it most freely in every way, except that they cannot increase the amount specified by it without the consent of the Crown. They can amend the Bill, and they exercise their power in that regard very freely. Why should our position be different from theirs? Where can we find that our rights in respect to amending a money Bill are curtailed to a greater extent than are those of the members of the House of Commons?

I think that the honourable member from Middleton (Hon. W. B. Ross) is to be congratulated for having drawn our attention to this very important question, and for having prepared a very exhaustive memorandum on the question. I rejoice in finding that both Mr. Lafleur and Mr. Geoffrion, who are lawyers of very high standing, constitutionally and otherwise, have adopted the same view. I cannot help noticing that Mr. Ewart seems to have taken a somewhat different view. Upon examining his letter it will be found that he does not claim that under the constitution the Senate is deprived of the power of dealing with money Bills; he rests his opinion entirely upon the practice. I must confess that the authorities to which he refers are