

limiting support to MOX fuel fabrication), to the participation of a particular industry in a donor country, or for that matter to the expenditure of the donor's contribution in the donor country only.

Although a practice of conditionality could yield a lengthy list of performance criteria, the expectation here is that the parties will insist on essential matters only. They will refuse to jeopardize the negotiation of a Multilateral Agreement by entertaining any discussion of peripheral performance requirements. That said, prudence demands an effort by all to ensure that disposition activity in Russia conforms to appropriate nuclear-safety standards. The need for standards to be met also applies to environmental protection. In the Canadian case, for example, the law requires that projects to which the Federal Government is party within and outside Canada be subject to a strategic environmental assessment (CEAA, 2000). As well, basic international security policy, to say nothing of the September 2000 Agreement, dictates that disposition of excess Russian WGPu be done in a manner that is assuredly irreversible. A trio of conditionalities should meet the needs of donors who would not only achieve a Multilateral Agreement but see that it performs as intended well into the future. But there is a problem in leaving it at this.

As currently understood, conditionality risks being treated as an add-on or afterthought to the main business, which is the business of getting to yes. To the degree that the imperative is to deliver the Multilateral Agreement, the parties are not going to have a lot of patience for add-ons which, by definition, have had to wait until most everything is worked out. And when closure is in sight, willingness to open up new lines of discussion will be even harder to find. What's likely to suffer in all of this is long-term sustainability. The problem here is shared by all parties.

Sustainable over the Long Haul

Disposition is an endeavour of such magnitude, complexity, and duration that the commitment of the parties at the moment of achieving the Multilateral Agreement, or later the Deal, is highly unlikely to drive implementation forward as desired over a period of decades. After all, we are considering disposition in a country which presided over the Chernobyl disaster not so long ago, and whose nuclear industry is unreconstructed. This is also a country which recently witnessed an attempt by its nuclear industry (Minatom, or the Ministry of Atomic Energy) to put the nuclear regulator (GAN, or Gosatomnadzor) out of business, and which saw its State Committee for Environmental Protection abolished and incorporated into the Ministry of Natural Resources in 2000. In circumstances such as these it is reasonable to expect controversy in the donor countries as well as the Russian Federation, even disabling controversy, about a plutonium disposition programme in Russia. It is more than reasonable to ensure from the outset that the endeavour is maximally resistant to political attack as well as physical mishap.

Disposition faces us with a situation which is not well addressed with the use of add-ons to a Multilateral Agreement. The dangers it presents could, if they came fully to life, do severe damage to persons, property, and the natural environment in Russia and elsewhere. Short of disaster, an accumulation of minor mishaps could drain international support from the disposition process. After all, donors would pay in annually over a period of decades, rather than up front all at once. Contributions could become a political issue. As well, it's all but certain that the Multilateral Agreement will include a withdrawal clause. Meanwhile, things going wrong at one